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WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND INQUISITORIAL PROCESS: 
THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS 
Chrisje Brants*† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Dutch criminal justice professionals, legal scholars, the media, and 
the public alike have always regarded the party-driven adversarial 
process and lay participation of American criminal justice as inherently 
unreliable. It has been said, for example, that Dutch inquisitorial justice 
produces fewer wrongful convictions than the American adversarial 
process.1 A variation on this theme is that it would be best to be judged 
by an American jury if you are guilty, but that a Dutch court would be 
preferable if you are innocent.2 Apparently, rational and professional 
judges, and appointed and impartial prosecutors in control of the police 
are regarded as better able to discover the truth and less likely to 
swallow implausible stories or bend the evidence than a bunch of lay 
people on a jury, (elected) partisan prosecutors, and autonomous police 
departments. More importantly, such sweeping statements reflect 
ingrained legal cultural notions of what proper justice should be. 
However, is there any truth to such assertions, or is it perhaps more 
likely that there just seems to be proportionately fewer miscarriages of 
justice in the Netherlands? I shall examine this issue in Part II of this 
Article. 
Whatever the answer, deeply felt ideas about proper justice can be 
traced to the basic assumptions that underlie different types of criminal 
processes. This raises questions about the relationship between such 
 
 * Professor of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, Utrecht University, Utrecht, the 
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 † This article is being published as part of a symposium that took place in April 2011 in 
Cincinnati, Ohio, hosted by the Ohio Innocence Project, entitled The 2011 Innocence Network 
Conference: An International Exploration of Wrongful Conviction. Funding for the symposium was 
provided by The Murray and Agnes Seasongood Good Government Foundation. The articles appearing 
in this symposium range from formal law review style articles to transcripts of speeches that were given 
by the author at the symposium. Therefore, the articles published in this symposium may not comply 
with all standards set forth in Texas Law Review and the Bluebook. 
 1. P.J. VAN KOPPEN & T.M. SCHALKEN, Rechterlijke Denkpatronen als Walkuilen: Over zes 
Grote Zaken en Derzelver Bewijs, in HET MAATSCHAPPELIJK OORDEEL VAN DE STRAFRECHTER. DE 
WISSELWERKING TUSSEN RECHTER EN SAMENLEVING 85–132 (2004); P.J. VAN KOPPEN, DE 
SCHIEDAMMER PARKMOORD: EEN RECHTSPSYCHOLOGISCHE RECONSTRUCTIE (2003); PETER J. VAN 
KOPPEN & STEVEN D. PENROD, The John Wayne and Judge Dee Versions of Justice, in ADVERSARIAL 
VERSUS INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 347–68 (Peter 
J. van Koppen & Steven D. Penrod eds. 2003). 
 2. An opinion recently voiced by a classroom of students taking a course in comparative 
criminal justice at Utrecht University. 
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theoretical differences and the proneness of one or the other system to 
produce wrongful convictions in practice. In other words, what, in 
theory, can typically go wrong in either system, and why? These 
questions are the subject of Part III. Part IV deals with Dutch criminal 
process and its specific vulnerabilities, while Part V provides a 
description of four major wrongful convictions that have occurred 
recently in the Netherlands and analyzes why wrongful verdicts were 
delivered by the courts. Such miscarriages of justice led to a public and 
political outcry that at one point called the very legitimacy of criminal 
justice into question. Thus, it should come as no surprise that several 
measures of improvement have been proposed which are the subject of 
Part VI. 
II. HOW MANY WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS? A SPURIOUS QUESTION 
That it should even be a matter of debate whether the adversarial 
process generates more wrongful convictions than the inquisitorial is 
somewhat ridiculous, given that there is no means of knowing how 
many people are wrongfully convicted in any one country, let alone 
whether the outcomes of one or the other type of system are inherently 
less accurate. As Samuel Gross has noted, “[B]y definition we do not 
know when [false convictions] occur. If we did, innocent defendants 
would not be convicted in the first place.”3 Even in the United States, 
where there is a relatively large body of research on the issue (in the 
Netherlands there is practically none), widely differing estimates 
circulate and almost all data concern wrongful convictions for serious 
offences such as murder and rape. Such estimates range between 
approximately 2.5% and 10%.4 That is considerably higher than the 
0.5% found by C. Ronald Huff et al. in 1996,5 a discrepancy possibly 
caused by the fact that this study covered all felonies and not just rape 
and homicide.6 
Like Gross,7 Dutch forensic psychologist Peter van Koppen has 
remarked that almost all known wrongful convictions concern cases of 
homicide or very serious sexual crimes. That same pattern is apparent at 
the legal clinic of the University of Maastricht in the Netherlands where 
Van Koppen is involved in the innocence project Gerede Twijfel 
 
 3. Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 175 (2008). 
 4. Id. at 177. 
 5. C. RONALD HUFF, ARYE RATTNER & EDWARD SAGARIN, CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: 
WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1996). 
 6. It should be noted that it has been considered methodologically flawed in other areas: Steven 
A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. 
REV. 891, 906 n.71 (2004). 
 7. Gross, supra note 3, at 179. 
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(Reasonable Doubt),8 even though the criteria for admittance to the 
project certainly do not preclude other, less serious cases. Peter van 
Koppen concludes that it would be wrong to extrapolate percentages 
based on wrongful convictions for homicide and rape to other types of 
crime.9 This conclusion may well be right, but we should not forget that 
rape and homicide incur severe penalties and draw a great deal of public 
attention; therefore, we are more likely to know about these crimes, 
while those wrongfully convicted for a minor offense are neither 
interesting from the point of view of the media nor are they likely to 
make the effort to have the verdict overturned. Indeed, the Criminal 
Cases Review Commission (CCRC), the official English innocence 
commission that examines possibly unsafe convictions, uses no criteria 
as to the type of case it will consider. While serious crimes are in the 
majority, the CCRC also reviews plenty of less serious offenses.10 
Looking specifically to the Netherlands, it is clear that wrongful 
convictions occur and that there have been a number of highly 
publicized exonerations by the courts in the past decade—all involving 
murder cases.11 But it is also clear that there are wrongful convictions in 
other types of cases too. A 1992 study found that the Dutch Supreme 
Court received 346 requests for cases to be reopened for revision 
between 1979 and 1991,12 of which 71 were successful (21%)—mostly 
concerning fairly minor (traffic) offenses.13 The same study also 
examined 35 so-called “dubious cases” that had not been reopened by 
the courts but were sent in by lawyers. While some of these cases surely 
represented wrongful convictions, there is no true way of knowing just 
 
 8. The project Gerede Twijfel is a legal clinic staffed by law students and supervised by 
professors, which undertakes investigations into alleged wrongful convictions. The criteria for the 
project to consider a case are that it has resulted in a prison sentence of four years or more, or a shorter 
sentence but with indefinite detention at a state psychiatric facility. See Project Gerede Twijfel, 
UNIVERSITEIT MAASTRICHT, www.geredetwijfel.nl (last visited May 15, 2012). 
 9. PETER VAN KOPPEN, OVERTUIGEND BEWIJS. INDAMMEN VAN RECHTERLIJKE DWALINGEN 
268 (2011).  
 10. About the Criminal Cases Review Commission, CRIM. CASES REV. COMMISSION, 
www.ccrc.gov.uk (last visited May 15, 2012). Of the 12,696 cases dealt with by the CCRC between its 
inception in January 1997 and February 2011, 445 (approximately 2.5%) were referred to the Court of 
Appeal where 314 of the convictions were quashed as being “unsafe.” It should be noted, however, that 
an “unsafe conviction” is not necessarily the same as a wrongful conviction, although in most cases it 
will be; neither does this percentage reflect convictions quashed by the Court of Appeal without 
intervention by the CCRC. 
 11. I will discuss these cases in detail infra. 
 12. H.F.M. CROMBAG ET AL., DUBIEUZE ZAKEN. DE PSYCHOLOGIE VAN STRAFRECHTELIJK 
BEWIJS 20 (1992). A similar study by the same authors has also appeared in English. WILLEM A. 
WAGENAAR, PETER J. VAN KOPPEN & HANS F.M. CROMBAG, ANCHORED NARRATIVES (1993). 
 13. Many defendants had been wrongfully convicted because of administrative errors (often by 
insurance companies), or because the real culprit had used their personal data; such traffic offences do 
not attract prison sentences but (automatic) fines. A minority of cases concerned more serious crimes, 
prison sentences, and mistaken verdicts delivered on the basis of flawed or insufficient evidence. 
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how many. The dearth of research and the fact that there are no 
systematic studies from which even remotely reliable estimates could be 
inferred as to the number or type of wrongful convictions by Dutch 
courts precludes any knowledge of how many wrongful convictions 
have occurred.14 Even more importantly, there has been great reluctance 
in the Netherlands to admit that the Dutch inquisitorial process could 
somehow be prone to wrongful convictions, despite increasing evidence 
that it has systemic weaknesses in practice. General awareness of such 
weaknesses and their potential consequences is a (very) recent 
phenomenon indeed. It probably explains not only the lack of research 
but also that very few cases in which defendants have been wrongly 
sentenced to lengthy prison sentences (or indefinite detainment in a state 
psychiatric hospital) have come to light. When the research mentioned 
above was published in 1992, it was more or less dismissed by 
practically the entire legal community as unscientific and 
unconvincing.15 
Until well into the 1990’s, only two serious miscarriages of justice—
one in 1923 and one in 1984, both wrongful convictions for murder that 
ended in exonerations—were generally known. However, in the course 
of the 1990s, a number of cases were taken up by the media and became 
causes celèbres. Additionally, between 2002 and 2010, five of these 
cases were reopened, resulting in exonerations. At present, there are at 
least seven other cases “that won’t go away,” if only for the simple 
reason that they have attracted the attention of journalists and moral 
crusaders. This still may not seem like a lot, but it should be borne in 
mind that 16 million inhabitants make the Netherlands a very small 
country compared to the United States, while both the crime rates and 
the general incarceration rates are also much lower. Add to this that the 
academic community, the media, and the justice system itself have only 
recently come to acknowledge that wrongful convictions not only can, 
but actually do, occur and are more than isolated incidents. Thus, it 
could well be that the Dutch inquisitorial system merely appears to 
produce more accurate outcomes as a percentage of all sentences passed. 
 
 14. One could measure the number of cases that are admitted to a revision procedure by the 
Supreme Court. However, these tell us next to nothing about wrongful convictions, as most such cases 
are concerned with inequalities in sentencing, while the statistics make no distinction between the types 
of issue that led to the revision. Peter van Koppen estimates that the project Gerede Twijfel has received 
about 200 requests since its inception in 2004, but many requests are, quite evidently, not cases of 
wrongful conviction; some cases are civil or administrative cases, in some cases the convicted person 
does not deny guilt but feels otherwise wrongly done to, and some cases are simply “people who have 
difficulty understanding the world,” as Van Koppen puts it. He will not hazard a guess as to how many 
potentially unsafe convictions the project has seen (personal correspondence with the author by email of 
12 March 2011). 
 15. See, e.g., C.J.M. SCHUYT, Het Juridische en het Sociaal-Wetenschappelijke Bewijs, DELIKT 
EN DELINKWENT 655–61 (1992). 
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This is the more likely since, as we shall see, even though the criminal 
justice authorities themselves now admit there is a problem, neither the 
system nor the available legal remedies make it necessarily easy to 
discover wrongful convictions and have those wrongfully imprisoned 
exonerated. 
III. INQUISITORIAL AND ADVERSARIAL PROCESS 
If we cannot know how many wrongful convictions have taken place 
in the Netherlands, any talk of the inquisitorial system being inherently 
stronger than the adversarial is simply spurious. But it is possible to 
examine that system in theory to discover whether it has systemic 
weaknesses and, if so, where. A comparison of the two systems is 
intended to clarify, for readers from adversarial jurisdictions, the basic 
features—strengths and weaknesses—of both systems. The emphasis, 
however, is on the inquisitorial system which, to those schooled in the 
adversarial way of thought, often seems highly peculiar and, in a direct 
inversion of what Dutch legal scholars think about American justice, 
incapable of producing fair verdicts. Nevertheless, it is impossible to 
properly understand how wrongful convictions occur in inquisitorial 
process without insight into how and why it is, in theory, a coherent 
procedural system with interrelated safeguards against miscarriages (as 
is adversarial procedure). 
This piece first compares the ideal-types of both systems. To help 
explain the internal equilibrium in which guarantees of truth finding and 
fairness, organizational principles, and authority, procedural roles and 
rights hang together in an overall structure. In practice, there no longer 
are procedures totally true to type. Given that almost all modern criminal 
justice systems combine procedural features of both traditions, it is better 
to consider them not as being totally adversarial or inquisitorial, but as 
positioned on a continuum.16 Indeed, rather than speak of inquisitorial or 
adversarial systems, it is more accurate to see modern jurisdictions as 
primarily “shaped by” the inquisitorial or adversarial tradition.17 It should 
be noted then that the terms inquisitorial and adversarial, neutrally and in 
their literal sense, clarify the essential difference between how each 
system seeks to find the truth: an authoritative investigation and a 
contest between parties respectively. 
What do the terms inquisitorial and adversarial imply? Inquisitorial 
 
 16. For a much fuller discussion, see Chrisje Brants & Stijn Franken, General Report on 
Fundamental Rights in Criminal Process for World Conference AIDC, Mexico 2008, UTRECHT L. REV., 
7 (Oct. 2009); CHRISJE BRANTS & ALLARD RINGSNALDA, ISSUES OF CONVERGENCE: INQUISITORIAL 
PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND AND WALES? 17–26 (2011). 
 17. S.A. FIELD, Fair Trial and Procedural Tradition in Europe (2009). 
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proceedings are associated with the torture, red robes, and pointed hats 
of an all-powerful, faceless Inquisition bent on establishing truth by all 
available means. Adversarial procedure has much less terrible 
connotations of medieval folk-gatherings under sacred oaks, communal 
decision making and solving disputes voluntarily before the elders of the 
tribe.18 Neither of these images, although reflecting a rather skewed 
truth about history, says much about criminal process in the past and 
nothing about the present. But, they do still give rise to stereotypical 
misinterpretations of unfamiliar procedure and to prejudiced notions 
about what type of procedure is best. The different procedural rituals 
that underlie such caricatures of folk memory have indeed left 
recognizable traces in the legal cultures and criminal justice systems of 
today.19 
Thus, it is not unusual to hear Americans describe the inquisitorial 
process as one in which the defendant is presumed guilty until he proves 
his innocence, although the presumption of innocence underlies all 
modern democratic criminal process. The burden of proof lies just as 
squarely on the inquisitorial prosecutor as on his adversarial counterpart. 
On the other hand, Dutch legal scholars, as we have seen, are sometimes 
convinced that the adversarial process, by definition, involves an 
ignorant jury and biased prosecution and police, and is, therefore, if not 
incapable of, seriously handicapped in establishing the truth in criminal 
matters. Yet, adversarial and inquisitorial criminal procedures are both 
geared to determining the truth and, moreover, to doing so in a fair 
manner that protects individual rights and interests. While neither 
system lays claim to the absolute truth, each seeks to establish a version 
of events that can be regarded as the relevant truth—acceptable and 
legitimate for all concerned and for society in general. Legitimate truth 
requires that it be established fairly, while procedural fairness is in itself 
a guarantee, albeit not an absolute one, that the truth will be found. This 
relationship between truth-finding and fair trial applies to both 
traditions. Where they differ fundamentally is in their concepts of truth 
and of the ideal way to find it. This dictates the type of necessary 
procedural guarantees and, in turn, is related to the civil and common 
law roots of the respective procedural models. 
 
 18. NICO JÖRG, STEWART FIELD & CHRISJE BRANTS, Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems 
Converging?, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 42 (Phil Fennell, Christopher 
Harding, Nico Jörg & Bert Swart eds. 1995). 
 19. Adversarial systems are mostly found in the common law countries where the law has its 
origins in English common law (therefore: England and Wales, the United States and all of the countries 
once colonized by the British). Inquisitorial systems are found predominantly in the civil law countries 
of continental Europe and the countries once colonized by them. 
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A. Inquisitorial Process 
Modern inquisitorial process shares with its ancient predecessor an 
emphasis on pre-trial investigation by powerful authorities as a means of 
truth-finding. However, the modern version is rooted in 18th century 
civil law traditions reflecting a concept of political society in which the 
state is considered fundamental to the rational realization of the 
“common good.” Because of the immensely intrusive powers needed for 
this task, the state is regarded with some suspicion because those powers 
represent a continuous threat to the liberty of the individual. Yet, it is 
expected to promote and safeguard individual liberty precisely because 
liberty is seen as transcending individual interests and as an essential 
part of the common good itself. In order to resolve this paradox, the 
exercise of state power is curtailed by written rules of law that also 
protect individual rights and freedoms (this is the original meaning of 
the European continental concept of Rechtstaat) and by the division of 
power within the state (trias politica). This calls for judicial scrutiny of 
executive action on the basis of written law and hierarchical monitoring 
and control within the executive itself.20 Consequently, only the written 
law can give the executive the power to infringe individual rights in the 
course of a criminal investigation; without such legally conferred 
powers, executive officials can do nothing. 
This political ideology is reflected in procedural and organizational 
arrangements. The assumptions of the civil law tradition imply that the 
state is best entrusted with truth-finding, but subject to written laws, 
judicial scrutiny of the executive, and internal hierarchical monitoring 
and control. These are the basic characteristics of modern inquisitorial 
procedure. The police, subordinate to the public prosecutor and the 
prosecutor himself (and sometimes, depending on the jurisdiction, an 
investigating judge), take the first but determinative steps towards 
establishing the truth. Logically, the final aim is to discover the 
substantive truth because anything less would be to overlook a priori the 
fundamental role of the state—guarding and promoting society’s interests 
in crime control and in individual rights and freedoms (including those of 
the defendant).21 In this context, finding the substantive truth implies a 
 
 20. For the classic description of the features of inquisitorial process that distinguish it from the 
adversarial in relation to the state, see M. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986); and for the specific features of Dutch 
criminal procedure in relation to its legal cultural tradition: C.H. BRANTS, Legal Culture and Legal 
Transplants, in NETHERLANDS REPORTS TO THE EIGHTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW, WASHINGTON 2010, at 1–92 (J.H.M. van Erp & L.P.W. van Vliet, eds. 2010). 
 21. This double duty imposed on the state is probably why Packer’s dichotomy due process-
crime control never seems to work very well when applied to inquisitorial systems: HERBERT L. 
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). 
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criminal investigation and presentation of evidence at trial that are not 
only as complete as possible, but also non-partisan, taking into account 
the possibility that a person may be guilty or innocent. 
What happens at trial is predominantly determined by the trial 
“dossier” compiled by the prosecution. During its compilation, the 
defense may point the prosecutor towards avenues of investigation 
favorable to the defendant and the prosecutor has a duty to investigate 
them, but once the case comes to court, the defense role is purely 
reactive—an attempt to cast doubt on the prosecution’s case, among 
other things, by prompting the judge to ask the relevant questions. The 
trial judge has an actively investigative function, although the central 
role of the dossier means that there is already one version of the truth on 
paper that guides the investigation by the court. In inquisitorial systems, 
the emphasis is, therefore, very much on pre-trial procedure. It is not a 
theoretical necessity that all evidence is produced in court, given that 
incriminating and exculpating evidence is already contained in the 
dossier, including transcripts of witness statements. 
Guarantees that the final decision can be accepted as the substantive 
truth lie in the prosecutor’s, or investigating magistrate’s, non-partisan 
role of representing and guarding all interests involved and in the 
prosecutor’s control over the police. Other guarantees also flow from the 
notion that the truth is best found through investigation by the state: the 
role of the defense in pointing to factual and legal deficiencies in the 
prosecution case and the limited, attendant rights necessary for this, the 
active involvement of the judges in the truth-finding process at trial and 
their duty to give reasoned decisions, and appeal on the facts—a full re-
trial before a higher court—as a form of internal judicial control. In the 
inquisitorial tradition, the legitimacy of criminal justice and the fate of 
the defendant depend to a large extent on the integrity of state officials 
and their visible commitment to non-partisan truth finding. What this 
system needs to work fairly is a good, i.e. non-partisan, prosecutor and 
an impartial judge willing to verify, actively and critically, the accuracy 
of the prosecutor’s case. 
B. Adversarial Process 
By contrast, the benevolent state that acts in the common good is very 
much less in evidence in the common law tradition. Indeed, neither the 
concept of the state nor of the common good exists in the same way. 
The public interest in criminal justice is primarily defined as an interest 
in crime control and security with which the authorities are entrusted for 
so long as they happen to be democratically in power. Next to, and 
separate from, this shared interest in peace and security, individuals 
8
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define their relationship to the state in terms of the rule of law: as a set 
of concrete rights and freedoms from particular forms of state intrusion, 
which they themselves can assert. Law is not given by statute, it simply 
“is”—law of and for the people, containing fundamental freedoms to be 
invoked against state intrusion that are self-evident, attach to individuals 
as of right (although they may be embodied in a Bill of Rights), and will 
be “found” through interpretation by the courts. 
These notions of individual autonomy form the basis of adversarial 
process. They also reflect a fundamental distrust in an all too powerful 
state, which is further displayed in the separation of investigative 
powers from those of prosecution. In civil law states, hierarchical 
monitoring (such as the prosecutor’s control over the police investigation) 
is premised on the notion of a strong and organic executive arm of the 
state. Under the common law, executive organs of criminal justice do not 
monitor each other. Rather, they exist in a state of co-ordinate authority. 
Adversarial prosecutors do not control the investigation—other than that 
they can refuse to prosecute a weak case or one where illegalities have 
occurred—and cannot tell the police what to do. 
The emphasis is on crime control and establishing guilt on the one 
hand (first during the police investigation and then at trial by the 
prosecution, acting for the people) and on individual participation and 
the capacity to assert one’s rights directly on the other (the defendant 
and his lawyer). Consequently, adversarial criminal process is conceived 
of as a struggle between parties in which the individual defendant fights 
his own corner. In the clash of opinions between prosecution and 
defense about “what happened,” the truth, it is assumed, will eventually 
emerge. That is possible only if each party has equal rights and uses 
them to try to establish their own version of events through pre-trial 
investigation and the presentation of evidence supporting that version at 
trial. An essential feature of adversarial trials is that they do not take place 
on the basis of a dossier compiled by state officials and reflecting all 
aspects of the case. 
What happens in court is not verification of the prosecutor’s—
essentially one-sided—case by the judge but the two-sided presentation 
of evidence and attempts by each party to falsify the other’s case in the 
presence of an impartial tribunal of fact. This logically means a tribunal 
not predisposed to a particular verdict through prior knowledge of the 
case, as well as not being biased in any other way. In such systems, the 
emphasis lies in the trial, which is, of necessity, highly oral and 
“immediate,” given that adversarial debate requires all evidence to be 
produced in open court. Contrary to inquisitorial procedure, where 
witnesses and experts are called as the court sees fit and examined by the 
judge on the basis of what is already on the table in the dossier, in 
9
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adversarial trials each party examines the other’s witnesses and their own, 
produces their own experts, and searches for and leads their own evidence 
in an attempt to establish that theirs is an equally, if not more compelling, 
version of events. The tribunal of fact is there to listen and to decide, and 
the judge makes sure the contest takes place according to the rules. 
Neither the tribunal nor the judge are actively involved in the process of 
truth-finding: that is the responsibility of the parties. 
Here, a formal concept of truth prevails, which also implies that parties 
may avoid the uncertainty of trial by agreeing it. So long as the tribunal is 
convinced or parties agree, and so long as the outcome has been reached 
through following correct procedure, whatever emerges as the “truth” in 
the course of proceedings can be accepted as such. For this partisan-based 
system to work, equality of arms between prosecution and defense is a 
must. The defendant not only needs investigative, confrontation, and 
presentation rights on an equal footing with the prosecution. The defense 
also must use the information and resources they have, use their 
investigative and adversarial presentation skills, and be able to assist the 
client at every point in the process. The partisan contest that is 
characteristic of adversarial process provides no safety net. Pre-trial 
investigation by the police aims to find evidence to support the 
prosecution case, not to establish facts that would aid the defense.22 At 
trial, the judge will not come to the defendant’s aid to assert his rights for 
him or take over the lawyer’s role. Also, there is usually no second 
chance, no appeal on facts that could have been put forward but weren’t 
because the defense investigation failed to unearth them or chose not to 
lead evidence although it was available. In other words, what the 
defendant needs more than anything else in adversarial process, is a 
good lawyer. 
C. Systemic Weaknesses 
Both of these systems work, and in the overwhelming majority of 
cases, they produce legitimate and acceptable results. But the features 
outlined above, which are, in theory, the great respective strengths of the 
inquisitorial and adversarial traditions, are also their great weaknesses. It 
is through those weaknesses that criminal justice systems become 
vulnerable to delivering wrongful convictions. Superficially, errors often 
seem the same, or, at least, very similar. In a comparative study 
 
 22. Although the adversarial prosecutor is also expected to be impartial, unlike in inquisitorial 
procedure this notion of impartiality implies no duty to investigate a suspect’s innocence, only to ensure 
and present sufficient evidence of his guilt honestly and without bias. 
10
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outlining the situation in many different countries,23 inadequate defense, 
wrongful or incorrect interpretations of witness testimony or expert 
evidence, overambitious police or prosecutors, pressure from the media, 
investigations that concentrate on one obvious (but wrong) suspect, 
confirmation bias, group-processes among adjudicators of fact, and false 
confessions appear as contributing factors in almost every country, 
regardless of the legal system. 
On closer examination, there are great differences in how such 
mistakes happen, how they enter the system, and the potential 
guarantees that prevent them from becoming disastrous. In other words, 
in their interrelated systemic characteristics, systems are vulnerable at 
different points. In the final event, the vulnerability of both systems can 
be traced to basic assumptions about the best way to reach accurate 
verdicts: the integrity of state officials in their non-partisan search for 
the truth on the one hand, party autonomy, equality, and equality in 
adversarial debate according to procedural rules on the other. Where 
these fail at any point in the process, a chain reaction can be set in 
motion leading inexorably to a wrongful conviction. That is why we 
must understand both the systemic strengths and weaknesses of a system 
before we can identify the causes (and potential remedies) of wrongful 
convictions. 
That a defendant is in control of his own situation in the adversarial 
system, rather than being primarily dependent on the integrity and 
competence of the police, prosecutor, and judge as in the inquisitorial 
system, is not only the logical consequence of the individualist political–
legal culture in which adversarial trials take place, but is also perhaps 
more preferable in terms of intrinsic rights of self-determination and 
even psychologically in terms of feeling less helpless. And certainly, 
from a scientific point of view, the presentation of and attempt to falsify 
two versions of events is surely a better way of arriving at the “truth” 
than verification of the prosecutor’s version by the judge—however 
many limited opportunities the defense may have had to influence that 
version in the dossier pre-trial. At the same time, the ability of the 
defendant to prepare and present his own complete and convincing case 
depends entirely on equality of arms between defense and prosecution, 
and on an informed and capable defense lawyer with access to his client 
at all points in the procedure. While, in theory, this should be the case, 
the reality is quite different. 
The same applies to expert witnesses and witnesses in general. The 
logic behind placing no restrictions on either party in introducing expert 
 
 23. WRONGFUL CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (C. 
Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds. 2008). 
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testimony (other than those which guarantee that the expert actually 
knows what he is talking about) is obvious in the adversarial setting, but 
it is precisely this that can be a factor in a wrongful conviction. Not only 
are there the actual handicaps under which defense lawyers operate 
when it comes to finding, and paying for, experts of the stature that the 
prosecution may present, there is a real risk that the partisan nature of 
expert testimony will induce experts to identify with the party for whom 
they are testifying rather than present balanced considerations founded 
on their own expertise. As for witnesses, the whole idea of partisan 
contest is one which, however compelling in the theory of truth finding, 
in practice may all too easily lead the prosecution to ignore the spurious 
motives and, therefore, the potential unreliability of witnesses in the 
overpowering desire to win. (The use of jailhouse snitch testimony is a 
case in point.) Again, though, the almost unlimited right to call and 
(cross) examine witnesses is a great strength of the adversarial system, 
at the same time it bears the seeds of its own potential for error. 
A final example is the instrument of plea-bargaining, which is in 
widespread use in all adversarial systems. A logical consequence of 
adversarial procedure is the acceptance of a version of events as the 
“truth,” or at least the relevant outcome of a trial, because it has been 
agreed between parties. There is much to be said for avoiding a 
distressing and costly contest where none is necessary. But despite the 
guarantees that adversarial procedures have in place to protect the 
defendant and ensure informed consent, all of the literature on plea-
bargaining points to the very real danger of the innocent defendant 
pleading guilty. This risk is exacerbated in states that have the death 
penalty or mandatory life sentences. 
In the inquisitorial system, partisanship when applied to anyone else 
but the defense lawyer is a dirty word. There are, in theory, no parties 
and, thus, no witnesses or experts for the prosecution or the defense. 
Instead, there are merely witnesses, and experts are not regarded as 
witnesses but are simply experts appointed by the court, often from state 
laboratories or forensic institutions. Appointment by the court has the 
great advantage of releasing an expert from any unconscious obligation 
they may feel towards the party they are assisting. The main danger here 
is not that they are inherently partisan, although that is always possible, 
but that precisely because they are regarded (and regard themselves) as 
non-partisan professionals, a court may place too great a reliance on 
their findings without there being an automatic response from an expert 
from the other side to contradict them. 
While there are differences in different inquisitorial jurisdictions, they 
all share the need to trust the integrity of the representatives of state 
institutions and, logically, a great and almost unquestioning faith that the 
12
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legal guarantees of the system at each stage in the process will prevent 
the state, in whatever guise, from going off the rails. Without such faith, 
the very basis of the system would be called into question. 
Paradoxically, this is precisely one of the strengths of inquisitorial 
justice: one can feel secure in the hands of a prosecutor, expert, or judge, 
from a legal culture where integrity and non-partisanship are expected 
and continually reinforced by training and experience.24 That may be 
preferable to being forced to place one’s fate in the hands of a lawyer 
who may or may not do a good job, depending, among other things, on 
how much he is paid. But again, in strength there is weakness. 
The relative paucity of the scope of rights available to the defense is 
directly proportionate to the defense role of “looking over the 
prosecutor’s shoulder”—making sure the prosecution does not lose sight 
of the defendant’s interests. But the proportion is derived from the 
theoretical understanding of the ideal role of other participants in the 
procedure, not from what may actually happen in practice. If the faith in 
the ability of those participants to contribute to fair truth-finding is, for 
any reason, misplaced, the defense lawyer may be empty handed in 
terms of defense rights to challenge the prosecution case on issues, or at 
a point in the procedure, where it could make a difference. 
IV. DUTCH CRIMINAL PROCESS 
While no system fits its ideal type entirely, it is nevertheless fair to 
say that Dutch criminal process is decidedly at the inquisitorial end of 
the continuum compared to most other European criminal justice 
systems. (Just as American process lies at the adversarial end, more so 
than, for example English process.) The Netherlands is, moreover, one 
of the very few continental European countries without any involvement 
of the lay public. Where most other jurisdictions have some form of jury 
or mixed panel, the Dutch consider criminal justice a matter primarily 
requiring the considered and distanced judgment of state-employed legal 
professionals and, therefore, place considerable faith in their ability to 
bring a criminal investigation and trial to a truthful conclusion. While it 
is impossible to describe Dutch criminal process in detail, the following 
is a short summary of its most salient features.25 
 
 24. Where adversarial prosecutors are partisan advocates and trained as such, the demands on the 
inquisitorial prosecutor require that he take quasi-judicial decisions, and training in inquisitorial systems 
takes place in the context of a career judiciary, of which, in many countries, prosecutors form part. 
 25. For a much more detailed account though still a summary, (on which this Part is based), see 
CHRISJE BRANTS, The Vulnerability of Dutch Criminal Procedure to Wrongful Conviction, in 
WRONGFUL CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 157–82 (C. 
Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds. 2008). 
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A. The Professionals 
Pre-trial investigation in the Netherlands is conducted almost 
exclusively by the police who may use only the powers granted by the 
Police Act and Code of Criminal Procedure. The police may arrest and 
interrogate persons against whom there exists a reasonable suspicion 
that they committed an offense and may hold suspects for a maximum of 
15 hours before involving the prosecutor. Detention can last for 3 days 
and, in cases of urgent necessity, up to 6 days. After the original 15 
hours has elapsed, custody must be ordered by the prosecutor, after 
which the judge of instruction (10 days), and then the court (90 days) 
may order further detention.26 During all this time, the suspect may be 
questioned by the police in the context of the prosecutor’s investigation. 
The police also have a number of intrusive investigative powers, the use 
of almost all of which requires the prosecutor’s permission. In general, 
the police are answerable to the Prosecution Service (and internally, to 
their superior officers) and it is the prosecutor who, is responsible for 
the investigation and may, therefore, also issue instructions to the police. 
That the police investigate all aspects of the case impartially is not 
literally required by law, but is a professional criterion deriving from the 
relationship between police and prosecutor—thus from an assumption of 
non-partisan prosecution. 
The Public Prosecution Service is a hierarchical organization, headed 
by a council of five so-called procurators-general (PG’s). The council 
can issue binding instructions to both the police and the prosecutors at 
the 19 district courts and five appeal courts (where they are called 
advocates-general—AG’s) and at the national prosecution department 
that deals with such matters as organized crime and terrorism. The 
minister of justice is accountable to Parliament for the actions of the 
prosecution service. Dutch public prosecutors are civil servants, trained 
after law school in the same way as judges: a five year theoretical and 
practical training course where, half way through, trainees opt either for 
the judiciary or the prosecution service. Constitutionally, the Public 
Prosecution Service is both part of the civil service and of the judiciary. 
Prosecutors are expected to adopt a quasi-judicial stance in their most 
important tasks, which are controlling and monitoring pre-trial 
investigation by the police; compiling a trial dossier of all relevant steps 
in the investigation and all relevant evidence, against and for the 
 
 26. Thus, the court case must begin, even if only formally, after 100 days. If the prosecutor is not 
ready, he must nevertheless make sure he subpoenas the defendant to appear and grants the defense full 
access to the dossier, at the latest 10 days before the first court appearance. He may then ask the court to 
set another date for continuing the trial to give more time to complete the investigation. There is a 
possibility of bail, but it is never used. As a consequence, suspects may spend considerable time in pre-
trial detention before their case is heard in full by the court. 
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defendant; and presenting the case at trial. This non-partisan role is 
safeguarded not only by training, but also by a hierarchical system of 
monitoring and control—both of the police and within the prosecution 
service. Disclosure ensures that the defense can play a role in shaping 
the dossier that is eventually presented to the court. The final safeguard 
is active scrutiny of the pre-trial investigation and the evidence by the 
judge, if necessary prompted by the defense. 
Originally, a non-partisan investigation was thought to be best 
safeguarded at the pre-trial stage by an investigating magistrate, of 
whom each court has several appointed on a rote basis. However, the 
magistrates’ investigative role has been reduced over the years, and now 
their main task is authorizing telephone taps and bugs, and interviewing, 
under oath, witnesses the defense wants to challenge but who will not be 
called in court. Dutch trial judges sit alone in minor cases, sit in panels 
of three in more serious cases, and in panels of five in the appellate 
courts. There is no jury in any case, criminal or otherwise. The defense 
and prosecution have the right to appeal to one of the five appellate 
courts, which will conduct a full retrial. The judiciary is a state 
institution where appointment for life, a (very) good salary, and the 
absence of government involvement in day-to-day matters serve to 
guarantee independence. Impartiality is part of the professional ethic: 
judges are fully acquainted with the dossier before trial, but are expected 
(and trained) to keep an open mind as to guilt or innocence. 
Every defendant in a criminal case has the right to be represented by a 
lawyer. If he cannot afford one, the defendant will be assigned an 
attorney. However, adults have no right to have the lawyer present 
during interrogations by the police.27 Most criminal defense lawyers 
take assigned cases, which pay substantially less, as a matter of course. 
Criminal defense lawyers’ role in criminal procedure is to represent the 
interests of the defendant and, pre-trial, they monitor the compilation of 
the dossier (not only as to the nature of the evidence but also the legality 
of police methods used to obtain it) pointing the prosecutor towards 
certain avenues of investigation. In court, defense attorneys attempt to 
weaken the prosecution case and direct the judge towards evidence 
favorable to the defense. Dutch lawyers have no powers of investigation 
(to approach and interview potential witnesses is regarded as tampering 
with the evidence) and cannot call witnesses or experts themselves. The 
lawyers are dependent on the prosecutor’s willingness to grant a request 
that a witness be heard and, in the final instance, on the court that can 
overrule or uphold the prosecution’s refusal to accede to a defense 
 
 27. This is currently a hot issue following recent rulings by the European Court of Human 
Rights. See infra, Part VI.C (describing the changes that are taking place as a result). 
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request.28 Experts are appointed by the court and do not appear as 
partisan witnesses.  
B. The Limited Role of Debate at Trial  
Dutch trials are exceedingly short compared to adversarial procedures 
because they are document-based and debate in court is very limited. 
With only professional participants, there is little need to elaborate legal 
details that are understood by all, while the evidence will have been 
systematically added to the dossier beforehand—including most witness 
statements. The role of the judge as investigator of fact precludes the 
necessity of cross-examination. Although the Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure seems to place trial in open court at the center of proceedings 
and requires that all witnesses appear, pre-trial investigation is the focus 
of truth-finding, and the use of hearsay testimony is widespread. 
Threatened or vulnerable witnesses (e.g. children, rape victims, police 
informers) are not often called at trial and are more usually heard under 
oath by the investigating magistrate in chambers. Also, threatened 
witnesses have their identity kept from both court and defense with only 
limited opportunities for the lawyer—though not the defendant—to be 
present or submit (written) questions. The investigating magistrate then 
provides a written report to the court, and evidence given to him is 
regarded as evidence given to the trial court. 
These procedures were introduced after the European Court of 
Human Rights gave a number of judgments against the Netherlands in 
which convictions had been based on unchallenged or anonymous 
testimony.29 While a poor substitute for hearing witnesses at trial, such 
procedures are consistent with the ideology upon which Dutch 
procedure in general is based. More important than the “principle of 
immediacy” that requires evidence to be presented at trial is that of 
“internal transparency.” All participants must be acquainted with the 
facts of the case as represented in the dossier on an equal footing so that 
there can be no conviction on evidence not known to the defense. 
However, the right of the defense to examine the complete dossier 
becomes absolute only ten days before trial and can be curtailed before 
that “in the interests of the investigation.” The assumption is, thus, that 
the prosecutor will, in his non-partisan role, have included everything 
that is relevant and will have looked into all aspects of the case before 
 
 28. The lawyer can also physically bring witnesses to court, by-passing the necessity to have 
them subpoenaed by the prosecutor. Even so, the defense must still convince the trial judge why it is 
relevant that they should testify. 
 29. Eur. Ct. H.R. 1997, App. No. 21363/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Van Mechelen v. The Netherlands) 
(Neth.); Eur. Ct. H.R. 1989, App. No. 11454/85 (Kostovski v. The Netherlands) (Neth.). 
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the trial starts. Internal transparency is also a guarantee that the court 
will not base its decision on incomplete evidence. That is, the prosecutor 
and defense counsel cannot agree to leave some things unsaid, 
effectively ruling out charge bargaining. In the final event, the court 
must arrive at the substantive truth so that a full trial must always take 
place, even if the defendant has pled guilty. 
The defense may challenge the accuracy of the prosecution case and 
request additions to the dossier or the hearing of new witnesses at trial. 
Such requests must be addressed to the prosecutor first. However, the 
active role of the court means that, within the criteria of the law, it has 
the final decision on which witnesses are to be heard; on whether the 
dossier is complete and relevant, or whether documents should be added 
to it or may be left out; and on whether expert opinion may be 
challenged by the introduction of other experts. In short, the court 
decides whether it considers itself to be in possession of all relevant 
facts. It is also the court that conducts the first and fullest questioning of 
witnesses. The defendant (never considered a witness in his own case 
and therefore never under oath) may speak in his own defense and 
always has the last word, but only if he so wishes. Dutch trials are 
essentially a debate on the relative weight to be given to the several 
pieces of evidence that the state has gathered in its non-partisan search 
for the truth. 
C. Guarantees Against Miscarriages of Justice 
In essence, Dutch criminal process relies almost exclusively on the 
non-partisan gathering of evidence by the prosecutor; his control of the 
police and their professionalism in conducting a non-partisan 
investigation without illegalities; the ability of the defense lawyer to 
“assist” in the compilation of the dossier, which is in turn dependent on 
the non-partisan professional attitude of the prosecutor; and on the 
impartiality and professional truth-finding activities of the court at trial. 
In short, the integrity of the system and its ability to police itself are the 
guarantees for fair procedures and accurate outcomes.30 This is bolstered 
by professional ethics internalized during training, and by hierarchical 
and judicial monitoring and control, that reinforce written rules of law 
geared towards ensuring fair and substantive truth-finding both pre-trial 
and at trial. 
Such pre-trial rules are primarily concerned with granting (and 
limiting) police, prosecutorial, and judicial powers to employ certain 
investigative methods and to arrest, detain, and interrogate suspects. The 
 
 30. JÖRG, FIELD & BRANTS, supra note 18. 
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Code of Criminal Procedure31 also gives certain pre-trial rights to the 
suspect. Under its provisions, a suspect has the right to access the 
prosecution evidence and to the assistance of a lawyer of the suspect’s 
choosing or provided by the state. The Code provides for lawyer–client 
contact and confidentiality for suspects in detention. If a pre-trial 
judicial investigation has been opened by the judge of instruction, the 
lawyer may be present when the suspect is interrogated by the judge. As 
there is no mention of any such right with regard to the police, this has 
always been interpreted to mean that, a contrario, the suspect has no 
right to have a lawyer present during police interrogations. This is 
accepted as established legal doctrine.32 Furthermore, undue pressure 
against the suspect is forbidden and a caution by the interrogator that he 
has the right to remain silent is prescribed. But, given the emphasis on 
substantive truth-finding by the state and the fact that pre-trial-rights 
could be used to hinder the investigation, the provisions granting these 
rights also have a second paragraph: “[U]nless in the opinion of the 
judge of instruction (or prosecutor, as the case may be) the interests of 
the investigation make the exercise of right X undesirable” (or some 
such formulation).33 
At trial, the defense’s role is secondary to the prosecution, while both 
are subordinate to the authority and truth-finding activities of the court. 
That, in its turn, is bound by elaborate rules of evidence. Dutch courts 
are not free in the evidence they may consider. There are rules on how 
courts may use evidence to construe guilt. Further, courts are 
constrained in regards to the weight they may attach to different sorts of 
evidence and in regards to the relationship between the evidence and the 
court’s decision that the defendant is guilty. The Code of Criminal 
Procedure contains a limitative list of what may be legally regarded as 
evidence: the court’s own observations during trial; statements by the 
defendant (including confessions); witness statements; other statements 
 
 31. The 1926 Code replaced Napoleonic legislation introduced during the French occupation of 
the Netherlands between 1810 and 1813, although any revolutionary “foreign” ideas such as legal 
assistance and jury trial were abolished as soon as the occupying armies left. On the lasting influence of 
Napoleon, see C.H. BRANTS, Legal Culture and Legal Transplants, in NETHERLANDS REPORTS TO THE 
EIGHTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, WASHINGTON 2010, at 1–92 (J.H.M. 
van Erp & L.P.W. van Vliet, eds. 2010). On the situation in the 19th and early 20th Century, see TARU 
SPRONKEN, VERDEDIGING: EEN ONDERZOEK NAAR DE NORMERING VAN HAT OPTREDEN VAN 
ADVOCATEN IN STRAFZAKEN [DEFENSE: A STUDY ON THE STANDARDIZATION OF THE ACTIONS OF 
ATTORNEYS IN CRIMINAL CASES] 9–18 (2001).  
 32. See, e.g., HR 21 May 1985, NJ 1986, 26. 
 33. The only exception is the suspect who is to be further detained (by the prosecutor) and who 
has the right to have a lawyer present at the detention hearing. The Dutch Bar has a system of duty 
lawyers to assist such suspects. However, even suspects detained by the judge of instruction or the court 
until the trial begins can be subject to denial or restriction of access to their lawyer “in the interests of 
the investigation.” 
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or written documents, such as reports by experts); and official written 
statements by investigating officers.34 With the exception of the latter (in 
so far as they do not in fact amount to the hearsay testimony of a single 
witness or the defendant), evidence requires other evidence as 
corroboration. A conviction may not rest on the statement of a defendant 
alone, on that of a single witness, or on anonymous testimony. 
Moreover, even if the court has sufficient evidence of the proper sort, 
it may not convict unless that evidence has convinced the court of guilt 
“beyond reasonable doubt.”35 If this causal requirement is not met, in 
dubio pro reo prevails. An extra safeguard requires the court to give a 
reasoned decision setting out the (legal) evidence by which it has been 
convinced. Both the defendant and the prosecutor have the right to 
appeal following the decision in first instance. The appeal court’s 
decision on the facts is final, although another avenue of appeal on 
points of law to the Supreme Court may be open (known as 
“cassation”). 
Given that even the most secure of evidentiary rules and the most 
professional of courts in two instances may still leave room for 
mistakes, there is also a revision procedure. The Supreme Court may 
order a case reopened (and, if necessary, retried) if new evidence casts 
doubt on the original decision. Either a convicted person or the 
prosecutor at the Supreme Court (also called advocate-general) can 
request revision. The procedure is designed to prevent the Supreme 
Court from becoming a court of third (factual) instance, by requiring 
that the Supreme Court establish, first, the existence of new evidence 
not known at the time to the original court (a so-called novum). If 
established, the court must find that such evidence, had it been known at 
the time, would have led the court that gave the final verdict on the facts 
to acquit. If the Supreme Court so finds, the case is referred to one of the 
appeal courts for a full retrial (but never to the court that originally gave 
the final verdict on the facts). Obviously, if another person has been 
convicted by another court for the same offense, this constitutes a 
typical novum, and this scenario is specifically provided for in the Code 
of Criminal Procedure. In many other cases, however, “new evidence” is 
strictly interpreted so that the requirement that the Supreme Court in 
effect second guess the original decision—and, therefore, also the 
decision that the referral court will reach on retrial—may prevent a case 
 
 34. Such reports may contain first hand evidence based on the officer’s own experience—for 
example that he found drugs in the defendant’s possession—but also may be the transcript (not 
verbatim) of an interrogation of a witness, i.e. hearsay. 
 35. This is known as a negative system of proof: the court may not convict without sufficient 
legal evidence even if it is convinced of guilt, but may also not convict if there is sufficient evidence but 
it is not convinced. 
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from reaching review. 
B. Vulnerabilities 
Although Dutch criminal justice lacks the safeguards found in 
adversarial process (and, indeed, in a number of inquisitorial 
jurisdictions that lie further towards the adversarial on our theoretical 
continuum), it is nevertheless an entirely coherent procedural system. Its 
safeguards are the integrity of the state institutions concerned, the 
cumulative monitoring and scrutiny that take place throughout the 
process, and the capacity of law and legal–ethical culture to ensure that 
each professional participant functions as required. If these guarantees 
work as intended, the system needs no external safeguards such as 
autonomous defense rights. However, just as adversarial process is 
based on the myth that adversarial debate between equal autonomous 
parties will produce the “truth,” so long as procedural rules are 
followed, so too is Dutch inquisitorial process based on a myth of 
justified confidence in a system of state-controlled state investigation 
and the small professional elite through which it operates. The problem 
is that, in real life, parties in a criminal trial are seldom equal in a 
material sense and procedural rules do not always produce the truth. 
Likewise, the supreme confidence the Dutch place in their self-
controlling system of criminal justice is no longer justified, if indeed, it 
ever was. 
That confidence has historical and socio-political roots,36 and it may 
be that the system originally functioned very well. In any event, there 
were few signs of public or legal–professional dissatisfaction (or of 
wrongful convictions) until about the 1980’s. The last two decades of 
the 20th century brought increasing public criticism of the criminal 
justice authorities, fear of crime, and general feelings of insecurity. This 
led to demands for more and better crime control. It was said that 
criminals were treated too leniently, that due process rights were abused 
in criminal procedure, that the police and prosecution service were 
making too many mistakes, that the courts were too slow, and that the 
process was too bureaucratic. Although Dutch legal culture traditionally 
regards public opinion as irrational and emotional and, therefore, as 
unwarranted interference in the due process of rational justice, these 
developments have rendered the whole criminal justice system highly 
sensitive to critical media coverage and demands for results that are 
perceived as assaults on its legitimacy. 
 
 36. See C.H. BRANTS, Legal Culture and Legal Transplants, in NETHERLANDS REPORTS TO THE 
EIGHTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, WASHINGTON 2010, at 1–92 (J.H.M. 
van Erp & L.P.W. van Vliet, eds. 2010). 
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The response has been new legislation to increase both the efficiency 
of pre-trial investigation and court procedure and the number of trials 
that end in convictions. The result has been an erosion of the traditional 
safeguards against wrongful convictions that the inquisitorial system 
relies. This has affected the practical commitment of the police and the 
prosecution service to non-partisanship and the legal requirements that 
ensure that courts convict only on the basis of reliable and corroborated 
evidence and commit their reasoning for the conviction to paper. The 
powers of the prosecutor have increased dramatically. On the other 
hand, the powers of the investigative magistrate (intended as an extra 
and impartial safeguard in criminal investigation) have been reduced. 
Similarly, defense rights have been curtailed, most especially 
concerning disclosure of the dossier before the 10 day limit, the right to 
have witnesses called, and the right to full retrial. For instance, in the 
interests of efficiency, appeal courts may, and under certain 
circumstances do, rely on evidence and witnesses originally produced 
without re-examining them. 
Consequently, what always was a process of verification of an 
essentially one-sided investigation has become even more one-sided. 
Changes to the procedural rules on how the court goes about its 
verification of the case make it more difficult for the defense to suggest 
alternative interpretations of the evidence. Case law increasingly 
requires the defense to show substantial reasons why the court should 
doubt the accuracy of the dossier or the legality or reliability of the 
evidence it contains. The defense in an inquisitorial system, however, 
does not have the defense rights or adversarial means and skills. Most 
importantly, the defense in an inquisitorial system does not conduct its 
own pre-trial investigation. Therefore, it is difficult to challenge the 
prosecutor’s version of events, especially if rights to access the dossier 
are restricted. This is exacerbated by the nature of inquisitorial 
investigation. It places a search for the substantive truth above all other 
considerations, especially in pre-trial process. Thus, when the most 
important steps in the compilation of the dossier—and the prosecutor’s 
version of the truth—take place, the defense has fewest opportunities to 
intervene. 
All through the investigative process, there are stages at which the 
prosecutor, investigating judge, trial court, and appeal court, are 
expected to scrutinize the conduct and results of the previous phase. The 
goal is to ensure that all avenues of investigation have been explored, 
including alternative scenarios that could point to innocence rather than 
guilt. The great theoretical strength of this system is that the cumulative 
nature of such hierarchical and judicial controls, combined with the 
rules of evidence and the possibilities of retrial and review, make it 
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possible to catch and correct mistakes. At the same time, the cumulative 
nature of both investigation and hierarchical and judicial supervision are 
also great weaknesses. In practice, these weaknesses can allow errors to 
accumulate so that even the final safeguards, appeal and review, fail in a 
chain reaction of misguided actions and decisions. Mistakes at the level 
of the police investigation may, therefore, run all the way through the 
system until the appeal court adds its own wrongful verdict to the 
process, the Supreme Court refuses to admit a request for review, or the 
referral court finds the innocent defendant guilty once again. 
V. CASES OF SYSTEMIC FAILURE: FOUR MAJOR WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
This Part now looks at the four most serious miscarriages of justice 
that have occurred in the Netherlands in recent memory. These cases, 
three of which came after the defendants made false confessions to the 
police, shook the legal establishment to the core, although not 
immediately; the first was dismissed as an unfortunate “incident.” 
A. Murder in Putten37 
Putten is a village in the east of the Netherlands with a predominantly 
protestant-religious population. In January 1994, a grandmother came 
home and found the body of her granddaughter who had been raped and 
strangled. A month later, four men were arrested on the basis of 
eyewitness testimony that their car had been seen in the vicinity of the 
house. The men gave conflicting statements on their whereabouts on the 
afternoon of the murder. During the interrogations that followed, two of 
the men stated that they had seen the others go to the house, and had 
seen them, through the window, sexually assault and strangle the victim. 
After lengthy interrogation, the other two then confessed to the crimes. 
Although the confessions (and one of the incriminating statements) were 
retracted at trial, the suspects were convicted in first instance and on 
appeal. The courts heard conflicting eyewitness testimony. Some 
witnesses put the men or their car at the scene of the crime. Others 
stated that they had seen nothing and no one in the vicinity of the house, 
while yet others said that the men—and the car—had been at home. The 
court also received rather uncertain expert reports. 
The forensic laboratory found DNA in semen left on the girl’s thigh 
and in hair found on the girl’s body. However, neither sample matched 
the DNA of the defendants. The same was originally said of a pubic hair 
 
 37. Based on the final exonerating decision by App. Ct. Leeuwarden, Apr. 24 2002, LJN: 
AE1877 [www.rechtspraak.nl]. 
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found at the scene, although a month later, after a second test, the expert 
changed his mind and reported that it “could not be ruled out” that the 
hair belonged to one of the suspects. Fibers were found on one of the 
defendant’s trousers which were said to “probably match” a rug at the 
scene of the crime. The evidence on which the convictions were based 
was the eyewitness statements placing the men near the scene of the 
crime, the partially retracted statements by two men that they had seen 
the defendants murder the victim, and the (retracted) confessions. The 
courts also took most of the forensic evidence into consideration. An 
expert testified at trial that the semen was most likely the result of 
intercourse with someone else prior to the murder, but that it could well 
have been “dragged out” by one of the defendants during the rape. The 
expert testimony on the pubic hair and the rug was taken as 
corroborating. The two defendants went to prison, continuing to protest 
their innocence. 
In the years that followed, the case was taken up by a well-known 
television journalist who devoted no fewer than 40 broadcasts to it. With 
the help of a respected, retired chief of police, the journalist 
reconstructed the case, concluding that the crime could not have taken 
place within the time-frame claimed by the prosecution and accepted by 
the courts. Additionally, the journalist and retired police chief concluded 
that the two witnesses (one of whom was of decidedly minimal 
intelligence) who said they saw the murder committed had lied (to 
which they admitted on camera) and that, in any event, it could not have 
been committed in that way. The journalist and retired police chief also 
found that the police had used undue pressure and tricks during the 
interrogations. It was also discovered that the police had fed the suspects 
information about the crime and told them they had irrefutable forensic 
evidence, and that this had led to the suspects giving false statements. 
The team of innocence crusaders also interviewed the forensic expert of 
the “dragged-out-semen-theory.” It was discovered that crucial 
information had been withheld when the expert was asked to report. 
Now, given that information, the expert declared that his original 
findings were spurious. The journalist and retired police chief also 
commissioned new DNA tests, not possible at the time of the trial, 
which showed that the semen and both hairs came from the same 
person. Despite these new findings, the Supreme Court refused to admit 
them as “new evidence” that would have led to a different verdict and 
several requests to have the case reopened were denied. Finally, the 
expert wrote a new report retracting his original findings about the 
semen. This, the Supreme Court accepted (redefining “new evidence” to 
include, “under exceptional circumstances, revised expert opinion”), and 
the case was referred to be retried. 
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The exonerating judgment by the referral court lists a catalogue of 
errors on the part of the police and, thus, by definition, on the part of the 
prosecution. There had been a highly stressful (though not illegal) 
interrogation situation that lasted two months, during which the suspects 
had no contact with the outside world or with their lawyers; the police 
had focused exclusively on the two suspects and had subsequently 
attempted to find evidence to “fit” existing suspicions, failing to follow 
up on eyewitness testimony that seemed to contradict such suspicions or 
to check whether events could have taken place as alleged. There was a 
perhaps deliberately incomplete dossier and evidence had been 
destroyed. Expert reports and witnesses were presented as definitive 
evidence but were either ambiguous or had not been given crucial 
information. The court that gave the original verdict on appeal was also 
shown to have accepted unquestioningly controversial evidence and a 
dubious reconstruction of the crime. In effect, the court relied on two 
retracted confessions, convenient eyewitness statements, and ambiguous 
expert reports, thereby ignoring any evidence that pointed to an 
alternative crime scenario. 
Finally, the advocate-general who represented the prosecution during 
the retrial came in for some severe, though subtly-worded, criticism. In 
putting forward the prosecution’s case, he had ignored or misrepresented 
the following. Most of the witness statements pointed towards 
innocence, not guilt. The pathologist had confirmed that the victim 
could not have been strangled in the way the prosecution alleged, which 
was how the crime was described in the false confessions. New forensic 
evidence had shown that the mitochondrial DNA in the hairs found on 
the victim’s body could possibly match that of the defendants, but that 
this could be said of anyone with any relationship to them whatsoever 
through the maternal line—a substantial part of the population of the 
socially isolated region where the crime took place. And finally, while 
the original, visual examination of the fibers of the rug suggested a 
match, forensic testing had now shown that, while there could possibly 
be a match, the fibers were present in fabric that could be bought in the 
village and could have come from anywhere, including the defendant’s 
own carpet. The exonerating judgment concluded that reasonable doubt 
as to the defendants’ guilt was underlined by the advocate-general’s 
failure, even during the retrial, to acknowledge this exculpating 
evidence. The exonerees later received € 900,000 ($1,200,000) in 
compensation. Also, in October 2009, a man who claimed to be the 
victim’s secret lover but knew nothing about her was convicted for her 
rape and murder. That case has now gone to appeal.38 
 
 38. The same defendant is also suspected of other murders. 
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B. The Schiedam Park Murder39 
In June 2000, an 11 year old boy and a 10 year old girl were sexually 
assaulted by a man in the bushes of a park in Schiedam, near Rotterdam. 
The girl was strangled, and the boy seriously injured. A passer-by called 
the police. The boy then described his attacker to police. Although the 
boy’s description of the attacker did not match the passerby’s 
appearance, and although other witness statements were contradictory 
(though all said they had seen a bicycle standing near the bushes), the 
police soon focused on the passerby as the suspect. The man had been in 
the park at the time of the attack and, significantly, was a known 
pedophile. Under protracted police interrogation, the suspect confessed. 
However, the confession was retracted just two days later. DNA found 
on the girl’s body and on the murder weapon did not match the 
suspect’s. Instead, the DNA had come from a third unknown person. In 
addition, an alibi gave the suspect practically no time to commit the 
crime. Yet he was convicted in May 2001 and again on appeal in March 
2002. The convictions were based primarily on the retracted confession, 
circumstantial evidence that the defendant had a bicycle, and evidence 
that the suspect was in the park at the time. The court backed this up 
through the prosecution’s reconstruction of the time frame, dismissed 
the boy-victim’s description of the attacker as not credible, and accepted 
the prosecutor’s explanation of unidentified DNA on the girl’s body. 
The prosecution claimed that anyone who had been in contact with the 
victim could have left the DNA, and the fact that the defendant’s DNA 
was not found was proof of guilt rather than innocence. The prosecutor 
declared that the defendant “had been careful not to leave evidence 
behind.” In 2003, the Supreme Court refused the defendant’s petition for 
cassation. But while he was in prison, rumors started to circulate that he 
was innocent. 
A leading academic from the Dutch innocence project, Gerede Twijfel 
in Maastricht, published a book outlining the case and casting serious 
doubt on the conviction.40 It later emerged that, after the innocence 
project finished its investigations, it sent its report to the head of the 
prosecution service in 2002, but he never answered. Again, the case was 
taken up by the media and caused some public consternation. In 
September 2004, the Supreme Court dismissed a request for revision, 
because nothing pointed to there being “new evidence.” The public 
 
 39. The facts are taken from the official report commissioned in January 2005 by the Prosecution 
Service (see infra) after it became apparent that someone else was most probably the perpetrator. The 
case was investigated by one of the advocates general at the Amsterdam appeal court, seconded by a law 
professor and an ex-police chief. The full report is available at RIJKSOVERHEID, www.rijksoverheid.nl 
(last visited May 15, 2012). 
 40. PETER J. VAN KOPPEN, DE SCHIEDAMMER PARKMOORD (2003). 
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clamor that something was wrong grew ever louder when journalists 
discovered that someone had been arrested for another crime and had 
confessed spontaneously to the murder in the Schiedam Park in August 
2004. Suspicions grew that the prosecution had deliberately kept this 
information secret. It would have certainly constituted new evidence at 
the revision hearing a month later. Gradually, it emerged that there was 
a match with the new suspect’s DNA, that he had no alibi, and that he 
had committed several other violent sexual offenses against children. 
Despite this, the prosecution service continued to deny mistakes had 
been made. By November, the media were talking about a prosecution 
disaster. In December, the convicted man was released and then 
exonerated after the Supreme Court had referred the case for retrial in 
January 2005. He received approximately € 600,000 in compensation, 
and the prosecution service set up an official inquiry into what had gone 
wrong. The chairman was one of the advocates-general at the 
Amsterdam appeal court, seconded by a law professor and an ex-police 
chief. What they found shocked the country. 
Believing they had their man, the police had pressured the suspect to 
confess and disregarded any evidence in his favor. Backed up by a child 
psychologist, the police had also exerted what was described as 
inadmissible and intolerable pressure on a young and traumatized 
witness to make him admit the description of his attacker was a 
fabrication. The child stuck to his statement, but neither the prosecutor 
nor the courts took him seriously. Indeed, the prosecutor in the first 
instance ignored anything that pointed to the suspect’s innocence. 
Before the original trial, and again before the appeal was heard, a 
number of scientists at the state forensic laboratory expressed serious 
doubts about the defendant’s guilt. The scientists also took the 
unprecedented step of twice speaking to both district prosecutor and to 
the advocate-general before compiling their report. None of this was 
included in the final version of the report and was not communicated by 
either experts or the prosecution to the court or to the defense team. 
Although the court and the defense knew that unidentified DNA had 
been found on the body, they were not told the DNA had also been on 
the murder weapon. 
The advocate-general at the appeal court did have doubts, but ignored 
them and said nothing about them in court. The forensic scientists 
identified sufficiently with the prosecution to leave their doubts out of 
the report. What was said to persuade the scientists during their two 
meetings with the prosecution is not known, except that the district 
prosecutor did tell them it was important to make sure that “the defense 
can’t run away with this DNA-business.” The defense lawyer, ignorant 
of the fact that only unknown DNA had been found on the murder 
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weapon, had no right to be shown the full results of the forensic 
institute’s tests, only what was in the final report. Nor did the defense 
have the right of cross-examination so that they could do little more than 
argue the case on the face of what was known. Forensic experts who 
testified were never asked about doubts because neither the court nor the 
defense was aware that doubts existed. 
In August 2005, the public effect of the inquiry’s report was greatly 
reinforced by another television broadcast. While the convicted man was 
in prison, his case had been used by forensic institute scientists during a 
course for police and prosecutors about DNA evidence. This case, 
scientists said, demonstrated how an innocent man could be convicted. 
Despite the fact that at least 200 police officers and prosecutors attended 
this course, only one chose to speak out. Finding no response from his 
superiors, this police officer approached the media and set in motion a 
lengthy and detailed journalistic investigation. The officer was 
subsequently fired. The program provoked a furious public debate about 
the state of Dutch justice in general and about the prosecution service in 
particular. Parliament demanded answers from the Minister but 
eventually accepted his version of events: no one had acted intentionally 
but “serious mistakes” had been made. The government did, however, 
promise a “program of improvement,” including a temporary innocence 
commission.41 Its investigations resulted in the reopening of the 
following two cases and the eventual exoneration of the convicted 
defendants. 
C. Lucia de Berk42 
Lucia de Berk, a nurse at a children’s hospital, was the subject of 
rumors between 2000 and 2010, which claimed that she was 
suspiciously often present when a child died. The hospital director first 
consulted a medical expert, who declared it unlikely that these deaths 
were all due to natural courses. The director then engaged in some 
amateur statistics. He ultimately concluded that it couldn’t be 
coincidence that Lucia had either always been the one responsible for 
the child’s medication or had been the last person present before they 
died. He then held a press conference about the deaths, naming the nurse 
 
 41. Commissie Evaluatie afgesloten strafzaken or CEAS—Commission Evaluation Closed 
Criminal Cases. 
 42. Based on positive review judgment, HR 7 Oct. 2008, LJN: BD4153, and exonerating 
judgment Hof Arnhem 14 Apr. 2010, LJN: BM0876 (both at www.rechtspraak,nl); J. DE RIDDER, C.M. 
HAARHUIS & W.M. DE JONGSTE, DE CEAS AAN HET WERK: BEVINDINGEN OVER HET FUNCTIONEREN 
VAN DE COMMISSIE EVALUATIE AFGESLOTEN STRAFZAKEN 2006–2008 (2008). Chapter 6, and the 
report by the CEAS-commission on the case are available at OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, www.om.nl (last 
visited May 15, 2012). 
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as a possible suspect. The police gathered information about the hospital 
unit where the nurse worked and about sudden, inexplicable deaths at 
other hospitals where she had worked previously. They also tapped Ms. 
de Berk’s telephone and consulted a statistician whose findings they 
took as proof that the suspicions were well-founded. Lucia de Berk was 
then arrested. Although she never confessed, and despite a lack of direct 
evidence against her (no one, for example, had seen her do anything 
wrong) she was convicted in 2003 for four murders and three attempted 
murders. De Berk was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2004, the 
sentence was upheld on appeal, but this time for seven murders and 
three attempts. The appeal court also imposed an order for indefinite 
detainment at a psychiatric institution. 
The court of first instance convicted on the basis of statistical 
probability in combination with corroborating evidence of unnatural 
death after the statistician testified that the chance that a nurse could be 
present at so many suspicious deaths or incidents was 1 in 340 million. 
Some medical experts, though not all, testified that at least four of the 
children had been poisoned with an overdose of medication. On appeal, 
the court rejected the statistical evidence (that had come in for a great 
deal of criticism in the media). However, one of the medical experts, 
unfortunately the one suggested by the defense, testified that he “was 
now of the opinion” that the first child had been killed with a non-
therapeutic overdose. This, the court took, as proof of murder. The court 
found corroboration in Lucia’s diary where, on the day of the death of a 
patient she was attending, she had written of “her secret” and having to 
“stop this compulsive behavior.” (Her own explanation was that she had 
become addicted to laying tarot cards in the presence of dying patients 
and felt she must stop; she had kept this secret because she felt it 
inappropriate behavior for a nurse. The court did not believe her.) The 
final verdict rested on these two pieces of evidence and what became 
known as “repeating proof.” That is, given that there was proof she had 
murdered the first child and that the deaths of the other six were 
inexplicable, there could be no other explanation than that Lucia had 
murdered them too. Lucia de Berk suffered a stroke almost immediately 
after the decision. The Supreme Court admitted the case in cassation, 
but only on the point that a life sentence could not be combined with 
indefinite detainment at a psychiatric institution.43 With that, any chance 
of overturning the verdict was eliminated by March 2006. 
To some, including her lawyer, it was obvious from the start that 
Lucia de Berk had been wrongfully convicted. A few worried citizens 
 
 43. TON DERKSEN, LUCIA DE B. RECONSTRUCTIE VAN EEN GERECHTELIJKE DWALING (2006); 
METTA DE NOO, ER WERD MIJ VERTELD, OVER LUCIA DE B. (2010).  
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developed into crusaders in her case, starting a website and blog to help 
get the case reopened.44 The problem then became finding the necessary 
new evidence. Statisticians and doctors appeared on television disputing 
the findings of the experts heard at trial. These statisticians and doctors 
claimed that the deaths were almost certainly due to natural causes and 
that the probability statistics were, quite simply, incorrect. One 
concerned individual, a professor in philosophy of science, published a 
book outlining the mistakes that had been made in the case citing a 
world renowned expert in this type of death in sick children. He 
approached the CEAS, asking them to reinvestigate and, once the case 
was admitted, the CEAS advised the prosecution service to push for 
revision. 
It was discovered that the police had concentrated from the very start 
on just the one suspect. It was also discovered that the statistician had 
not included in his investigation a comparison with the other deaths in 
other hospital units where Lucia de Berk had not been present. Further, 
new calculations showed nothing suspicious about De Berk’s presence 
at so many deaths. In fact, given her position as staff nurse, it would 
have been unusual if she had not been there. It also became clear that the 
report by forensic psychiatrists on the content of her diary had been 
ignored by the prosecution and the court, and most importantly, that the 
findings of the one medical expert who had stated that the first child had 
been deliberately overdosed were categorically repudiated by the 
world’s leading expert in such cases. The prosecution at the Supreme 
Court feared that none of this could be regarded as “new evidence” 
because it had been known to the appeal court at the time even if it had 
not realized its significance. Nevertheless, the advocate-general at the 
Supreme Court again reinvestigated the case and requested revision 
because, in his opinion, the children had died of natural causes, and 
therefore, no crime had been committed. The advocate-general thought 
it difficult to construe his findings as “new evidence,” but the Supreme 
Court admitted the case on the basis of “progressive scientific insight,” 
and referred it to the appeal court in Amsterdam. Lucia de Berk was 
released awaiting the decision, and she was exonerated in April 2010. 
She received compensation of unknown, but reportedly “gigantic” 
proportions. 
 
 44. See, for example, the website started by Metta de Noo, Licht voor Lucia, LUCIA DE B., 
www.luciadeb.nl (last visited May 15, 2012). See also the blog started by Piet Groeneboom, PIET 
GROENEBOOM’S BLOG, http://pietg.wordpress.com (last visited May 15, 2012). 
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D. Ina Post45 
This last case is the oldest in this series, but it is the most recent 
exoneration, which became possible only because of the existence of the 
CEAS. In August 1986, an 89 year old woman was strangled in an 
apartment block for the elderly. Several checks were stolen and later 
cashed—presumably by the murderer. The police used these checks to 
conduct a graphology test of the handwriting of the victim’s caregivers, 
one of whom was Ina Post. She became a chief suspect because her 
signature resembled that of the presumed murderer and because the 
police found her “nervous” when she complied with their request that 
she produce a sample of her handwriting and signature. Ms. Post was 
thereafter detained for questioning. During police questioning, she twice 
confessed to committing the murder. However, she later retracted the 
confessions. Ms. Post was subsequently found guilty in first instance 
and again on appeal on the basis of her retracted confessions, and 
“nervous behavior,” the expert’s opinion that the signature on the checks 
was not the victim’s, and the expert’s inability to rule out that the 
signature could have been the defendant’s. The Supreme Court refused a 
petition for cassation. Four requests for revision were also refused. The 
requests were based on new graphology tests, on expert testimony that 
Ina Post was highly suggestible, on information contained in interviews 
with a number of the police officers who participated in the 
investigation, on expert reports on new developments in graphology, 
and on reports questioning the authenticity of Post’s confessions.46 As 
far as the Supreme Court was concerned, none of this was new 
evidence.47 
From the very beginning, the conviction of Ina Post attracted a great 
deal of media attention. Several people took up her case, including 
Post’s aunt, a private detective, and a probation officer. In later years 
(the conviction took place long before the general population had access 
to the Internet), blogs and websites were created on her behalf. Also, the 
case was examined by the Maastricht innocence project, which found 
the conviction to be flawed and later referred the case to the CEAS-
commission. The latter came to a number of devastating conclusions. 
First, the CEAS-commission concluded that the police had acted on 
unsubstantiated assumptions that had strongly determined the direction 
 
 45. Based on the exonerating judgment of June 6 2010, LJN BN94444 and the reconstruction by 
the CEAS Commission (CEAS 2006/0018), on OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, www.om.nl (last visited May 
15, 2012). 
 46. See, e.g., HAN ISRAËLS, DE BEKENTENISSEN VAN INA POST (2004). 
 47. After the Putten case, the Supreme Court returned to its previous strict definition of new 
evidence, which was one of the reasons why it took so long to exonerate Ina Post. 
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of the investigation. Specifically, these assumptions included the time of 
death being around 7 p.m., that the victim must have known her killer 
well, and later, that Ina Post had committed both the theft and the 
murder. As a result, the investigation became focused on finding proof 
of her guilt, not on establishing facts. Post’s alibi was not verified, and 
police did not follow up on information that the murder could be linked 
to another death in the same apartment block with roughly the same 
modus operandi—in which Post could not possibly have been involved. 
Police ignored other indications that they had the wrong suspect, such as 
the failure to find any identification or other corroborating evidence. 
Additionally, the police failed to investigate the defendant’s knowledge 
of details of the crime, which could have been obtained from the media 
and, indeed, in many cases were provided by the police themselves. 
Also, the police used suggestive, forceful questioning had twice led Post 
to confess, falsely, to both theft and murder. The CEAS recommended 
that the case be reopened and, in 2009, the Supreme Court granted 
Post’s request for revision, referring the case to the Appeal Court, which 
finally acquitted Post in October 2010. At the time of writing, it is 
unknown whether she received compensation. 
VI. PROPOSED REMEDIES 
The cases outlined above are classic demonstrations, though in 
slightly different ways, of how self-repeating errors and confirmation 
bias can occur in the Dutch criminal justice system. These errors have a 
number of factors in common: flawed or biased police investigations,48 
tunnel vision, and the dubious role of forensic experts. While the police 
and prosecution seem to have been singularly inept in handling the case 
against Ina Post, the defendants in both the Putten and Schiedam Park 
cases were unfortunate enough to come up against prosecutors and 
experts actively conniving with the police to ignore indications of 
innocence. More importantly, these persons kept exculpating evidence 
away from the defense and the courts. Such aspects represent drastic 
failures of the guarantees typical of inquisitorial systems, but the most 
remarkable feature of all four cases is that the guarantees on which the 
Dutch system could be said to rely most in the final event—the active 
judge at trial and appeal, and the revision procedure—also failed to 
operate properly. The courts in all instances convicted or upheld 
convictions on evidence that was so flawed as to arouse serious doubts 
among academics and other (professional) outsiders. The judges 
 
 48. It should also be noted that three of the cases involve false confessions while the fact that 
Lucia de Berk never confessed was not for want of trying on the part of the police. 
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disregarded indications of possible innocence and failed to investigate 
further (although to be fair, in the Schiedam case the court was not 
totally informed about the scope of exculpatory evidence). 
Although a confession is not enough under Dutch law to convict, 
false confessions, even if retracted, weigh heavily against the 
defendants. These cases show that the court can also reason away 
discrepancies between the prosecutor’s version of events and the 
defendant’s, alibi testimony, or forensic evidence, and that judges 
sometimes accept flawed forensics without question. Lucia de Berk is of 
a slightly different order. There was no confession and no apparent 
reason for the court to doubt the police and prosecution case or the 
expert evidence. However, De Berk’s case shows the dangers of rules of 
evidence. These rules, although designed to do the opposite, actually 
allow courts to scrape together a conviction without really questioning 
the prosecution case. Perhaps most importantly, the rules of evidence 
allow courts to confirm what they believe in the first place. The 
construction of “repeating proof” is particularly alarming. Indeed, the 
courts (and experts) seem to have been carried away on the vicious 
preconception of guilt that informed public opinion in the case of Lucia 
de Berk.49 The appellate court, for example, went out of its way—as De 
Berk’s lawyer later bitterly complained—to put the worst possible 
interpretation on the evidence. 
These cases, each in their own way, occasioned much public and 
political unease and also led to changes in the Dutch justice system. 
Some changes were self-imposed by the judiciary, though possibly 
unconsciously. Peter van Koppen has noted, for example, that courts are 
significantly more inclined to acquit in cases of homicide since the 
Schiedam Park murder case.50 The manner in which the district court of 
Rotterdam had all too readily accepted the improbable prosecution case 
especially shocked the courts. This led the Rotterdam judges to conduct 
their own internal inquiry. The same case, which was particularly 
upsetting because it demonstrated lack of integrity on the part of the 
prosecution,51 also led to the “program of improvements” and the 
creation of the CEAS. The case also prompted a legislative proposal to 
amend the review procedure. Meanwhile, the European Court of Human 
Rights has handed down a number of judgments that appear to make the 
presence of a lawyer during police interrogations mandatory—
 
 49. She was the subject of a sustained whispering campaign of gossip by her colleagues and 
regularly depicted as a witch—sometimes literally in cartoons—by the media. 
 50. PETER VAN KOPPEN, OVERTUIGEND BEWIJS: INDAMMEN VAN RECHTERLIJKE DWALINGEN 
289 (2011). 
 51. Although the same could be said of the murder in Putten, that case was originally dismissed 
as a one-off, while many in the judiciary continued to insist that the exonerees were guilty. 
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specifically mentioning the prevention of miscarriages of justice in its 
reasoning. This has also resulted in changes to the position and rights of 
the defense pre-trial. In this part, I briefly outline the most important of 
these proposed remedies. 
A. Program of Improvements 
The official inquiry committee, which was set up following the 
denouement of the Schiedam Park murder case, made a number of 
recommendations. All of these were accepted by the minister of justice, 
after which the police, the prosecution service, and the national forensic 
institute (NFI) produced plans showing how these recommendations 
were to be implemented.52 These plans are highly detailed and, in some 
cases, seem to be no more than a combination of professional 
investigation requirements and common sense. For example, the 
requirements mandate that police and prosecutors be properly trained to 
investigate high profile, serious cases; that during and after an 
investigation all material should be correctly collected and kept; and that 
the NFI should produce reports that are clear and can be understood by 
police, prosecutors, courts, and defense lawyers.53 Other measures are 
clearly reactions to specific details of the Schiedam Park murder case. 
These measures include new rules that apply if scientists at the NFI have 
doubts as to whether police and prosecutor are taking the right decisions 
or are focusing on the right suspect. Due to these new protective 
measures, scientists must commit their doubts to paper and discuss these 
doubts with the NFI director. If the NFI director agrees, he must discuss 
the doubts with the prosecutor and the judge of instruction, who also 
decides whether the defense will be present at this discussion. The NFI 
report of doubts must be included in the dossier so that the court, and 
also the defense, will always be informed before trial that doubts exist. 
There are also improvements that are much more general and are 
specifically aimed at improving the quality of policing and prosecution 
and, thus, preventing erroneous convictions. 
Throughout, the report is based on the notion of the impartial, quasi-
judicial prosecutor. An important aspect of the prosecutor’s work is 
evaluating the police case, which must not mean simply asking whether 
 
 52. Versterking Opsporing en Vervolging: Naar Aanleiding van het Evaluatierapport van de 
Schiedammer Parkmoord [Strengthen Investigation and Prosecution: Following the Evaluation of the 
Schiedam Park Murder], OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, POLITIE NFI (Nov. 4, 2005), 
http://www.how2ask.nl/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Rapport-versterking-opsporing-en-vervolging.pdf. 
 53. Id. at 26, 37, 46–50. These are not, however, superfluous exhortations, given that in the 
Putten case (but there have been many others too) forensic material was found to be contaminated 
through incorrect procedures and that all of these cases involve some measure of misunderstanding 
about the implications of forensic evidence.  
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there is sufficient evidence to convict. Rather, the prosecution must 
make sure that, before the case comes to court, it has been examined 
from all angles and that the right value has been placed on any possibly 
exculpating evidence. Organized evaluation of all aspects of the case, 
first internally by the police and then by the prosecution is, therefore, 
now mandatory. If there is any doubt, prosecutors should seek review by 
a third party, such as an academic.54 
B. Audiovisual Registration of Police Questioning 
While measures such as organized evaluation and third-party review 
are intended to prevent tunnel vision and confirmation bias from setting 
in from the police investigation onwards, others measures are aimed 
specifically at preventing false confessions. As long as some sort of due 
process awareness has colored Dutch legal thinking about the position of 
the suspect,55 there have been discussions about what due process 
actually means. Inquisitorial ideology regards the suspect as an object of 
investigation and the most important source of information. How is this 
to be reconciled with pre-trial rights? 
The most contested provision of the new Code in 1926 forbade undue 
pressure against the suspect and prescribed a caution that he had the 
right to remain silent. Many thought this quite mad, for it contradicted 
the principle that the state must search for the truth by all appropriate 
means: “[S]urely criminal procedure is about revealing the truth and 
eliciting the facts from the suspect who knows best what happened.”56 
The caution was nevertheless included, but soon abolished in 1937 and 
not reinstated until 1974. This was regarded as sufficient protection 
against undue pressure, self-incrimination, and false confessions. 
Defense lawyers regularly advocated some form of external monitoring 
of police questioning. However, it was not until 1995, amidst public 
doubts about the guilt of the men convicted of the murders in Putten that 
the government bowed to demands for the video taping of 
interrogations. But, the government dragged its heels until the wrongful 
conviction in the Schiedam Park murder case of 2005. This, followed by 
the cases of Lucia de Berk and Ina Post, forced the minister of justice’s 
hand. 
 
 54. Id. at 18–22. 
 55. From the introduction of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the 1920’s onwards. 
 56. For these and many more examples, see J J.H. DRENTH, DE HISTORISCHE ONTWIKKELING 
VAN HET INQUISITOIRE STRAFPROCES 224–28 (1939); JAN HENDRIK DRENTH, BIJDRAGE TOT DE KENNIS 
DER HISTORISCHE ONTWIKKELING VAN HET ACCUSATOIRE TOT HET INQUISITOIRE STRAFPROCES 
[CONTRIBUTION TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADVERSARIAL TO THE 
INQUISITORIAL TRIAL] 224–28 (1939). 
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The police have now introduced a new manual, have improved 
training on interrogation techniques, and have made officers aware of 
the danger of false confessions. The prosecution service has produced 
binding guidelines on the audiovisual registration of police questioning 
of suspects, witnesses, or those reporting a crime.57 These guidelines are 
highly detailed, ranging from the situations in which registration is 
obligatory to exactly how it should take place, how data should be 
stored, and whether the defense should receive copies. At present, the 
guidelines’ scope is somewhat restricted, given that the police districts 
of Amsterdam and surrounding area, Rotterdam, and The Hague are 
exempted.58 (In short, video or audio tape-recording is now mandatory 
for all suspected crimes if the victim has died, the possible prison 
sentence is 12 years or more, the possible prison sentence is less but the 
victim has sustained serious injury, or the case concerns a serious sexual 
offense. Audiovisual registration is obligatory if experts assist the police 
during questioning, the person questioned is vulnerable (younger than 
16 or mentally impaired), and the case falls under one of the above 
categories, or a witness is questioned by a behavioral expert. In all other 
cases, the prosecution or the judge of instruction may decide that 
audiovisual registration is necessary, depending on the person 
concerned, the nature of the case, or how questioning is proceeding. 
Visual registration of questioning must be such that all concerned are 
visible, and children must be questioned in a non-threatening 
environment. 
If the suspect wishes to hear or see, together with his lawyer, the 
recording of his interrogation or that of a witness, or if the lawyer 
wishes to do so alone, a request must be filed with the public prosecutor. 
The prosecutor will then inform the police officer leading the 
investigation. The same guidelines go on to say where this may take 
place but do not specify if, or when, such a request may be denied. The 
rules expressly prohibit the defense receiving copies of the registration. 
Appendix 3 to the guidelines, however, specifically deals with this issue. 
According to standing case law of the Supreme Court, the defense has 
no right to receive a copy of the registration but does have a right to 
know that it has taken place and to request that (parts of) it be filed as 
evidence in the dossier. This disclosure right may be limited pre-trial if 
the interests of the investigation or of vulnerable witnesses should take 
 
 57. AANWIJZING AUDITIEF EN AUDIOVISUEEL REGISTREREN VAN VERHOREN VAN AANGEVERS, 
GETUIGEN EN VERDACHTEN (2010A018), 6 Apr. 2009 (in force 1 Sep. 2010–31 Aug. 2014), STC. 2010, 
no. 11885, available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0027982/geldigheidsdatum_21-05-2011. 
 58.  These are the three metropolitan areas where most of the crimes to which the guidelines 
refer are committed. 
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precedence over those of the defendant.59 After registered interrogations 
have become part of the dossier,60 the defense may still be refused a 
copy because of the privacy rights of third persons. 
C. The Presence of Lawyers During Police Questioning 
Despite the evidence that false confessions were a real danger, the 
presence of a lawyer during police questioning remained absolutely 
prohibited, both for the criminal justice authorities and for many legal 
scholars.61 Calls by the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture (the last one, in 2008, referring explicitly to the prevention of 
miscarriages of justice) to review the legal aid situation,62 were ignored. 
However, the European Court of Human Rights has upset this stubborn 
Dutch doctrine. The European Convention has direct effect in the 
Netherlands and is of higher status than national law. The courts can and 
must apply the European Convention’s provisions—and their 
interpretation by the European Court—directly.63 The impact of Salduz 
v. Turkey and the string of decisions that followed64 became even more 
significant since they coincided with the revelation of the miscarriages 
of justice described in this Article. In what is known as the Salduz case 
law, the European Court appears to require the presence of a lawyer 
during police questioning. The wording of the judgments, however, is 
ambiguous, a fact which the Dutch courts and criminal justice 
authorities use to minimize the effect of these European judgments. 
On June 20, 2009, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled on a case 
resembling the Salduz case in so far as it involved a minor in police 
custody whose statements, which were made without the assistance of a 
lawyer and were later retracted, were used as evidence.65 The European 
 
 59. The prosecution refers to another decision by the Supreme Court: HR 7 May 1996, NJ 1996, 
687. 
 60. (and are, therefore, open to inspection by the defense at the latest 10 days before trial). 
 61. AFRONDING EN VERANTWOORDING: EINDRAPPORT ONDERZOEKSPROJECT STRAFVORDERING 
2001 78–79 (M S GROENHUIJSEN & G KNIGGE eds. 2004). 
 62. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM. FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR 
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, REPORT TO THE AUTHORITIES OF THE KINGDOM OF THE 
NETHERLANDS ON THE VISITS CARRIED OUT TO THE KINGDOM IN EUROPE, ARUBA, AND THE 
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES BY THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND 
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (CPT) IN JUNE 2007, 2 CPT/Inf (2008), 
available at http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/states/nld.htm (concerning a visit to the Netherlands in 2007). 
 63. The Dutch Constitution is not directly applicable; this makes the European Convention 
effectively the only Bill of Rights in the Netherlands.  
 64. Salduz v. Turkey, App. No. 36391/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008); Dayanan v. Turkey, App. No. 
7377/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010); Pishchalnikov v. Russia, App. No. 7025/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Brusco 
v. France, App. No. 1466/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). 
 65. HR 30 June 2009, LJN BH3084. 
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Court’s decisions were not entirely clear and could be read restrictively 
or expansively—what does “from the first interrogation” mean, is 
“access to a lawyer” the same as “assistance of a lawyer” and does this 
imply physical presence during police interrogation? The Supreme 
Court took all this to mean that any suspect has the right to consult a 
lawyer prior to the first police interrogation (i.e., formal questioning 
after arrest), to be informed of that right, and except in cases of an 
unequivocal waiver or if there are other urgent reasons, to be able within 
reasonable limits to exercise that right. But the Dutch Court found there 
was no general right to have a lawyer present during an interrogation. 
Minors form an exception, though, as they do have the right to have a 
lawyer or other “person of trust” with them in the interrogation room. 
Statements made by the suspect without his having enjoyed the 
(relevant) right, and any other evidence found as a direct result of such 
statements if raised as a defense should, in principle, be excluded. 
The prosecution service followed with a set of binding instructions66 
based on the idea that no more than a right to prior consultation is 
required for adults. These instructions qualify such consultation rights, 
of which every suspect must be informed on arrest, according to the 
seriousness of the offense. In the most serious cases, suspects must also 
be informed that this legal assistance is free and that the right to 
consultation cannot be waived. In the most minor cases, the suspect 
must be informed of his right to counsel and that, should he wish to 
exercise that right, he will have to pay for a lawyer himself. The police 
must always inform the pool of duty lawyers67 or an attorney of the 
suspect’s choice, and wait for a maximum of two hours for the lawyer to 
arrive before starting the interrogation. After 30 minutes of consultation, 
the interrogation may begin. Should a “life-threatening” situation arise 
that requires immediate police action, the prosecutor may authorize the 
police to start the interrogation immediately without the lawyer. 
Suspects who make spontaneous statements before being cautioned must 
still be informed of their consultation rights. The police may not ask 
further questions until the lawyer has arrived or the right has been 
waived. If new suspicions arise during the interrogation, there is no need 
to inform the suspect again of his consultation rights. 
Given that there has not yet been a case against the Netherlands in 
Strasburg, it is a moot question as to whether the new rules meet the 
European standard. This is especially so since the European Court has 
clarified the Salduz decision in Brusco v France.68 There now seems to 
 
 66. Aanwijzing Rechtsbijstand Politieverhoor (2010A007) STC 2010 4003, available at 
http://www.om.nl/organisatie/beleidsregels/overzicht/jeugd/@155139/aanwijzing-0/.  
 67. See supra note 33 (describing the system of duty lawyers). 
 68. Brusco v. France, App. No. 1466/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). This case involved an adult who 
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be little room for doubt that the rights of a fair trial include the right to 
have a lawyer present—although the European Court has still not used 
the magic words: “physical presence.” In response to parliamentary 
questions, the Dutch minister of justice and security again interpreted 
the words of the European Court as restrictively as possible: “the 
suspect must have the opportunity to consult with a lawyer before and 
during the investigation . . . which does not lead directly to the 
conclusion that the lawyer must be present at the interrogation.”69 
However, in what might have been a last ditch interpretative stand, in 
his comments on the Brusco decision, even the minister of justice and 
security has reluctantly conceded, “[I]t can by no means be ruled out 
that in future” there will be a right to have a lawyer present during 
police interrogations.70 
D. Innocence Commission CEAS and New Rules on Revision 
The CEAS commission installed immediately after the Schiedam 
Park murder to look into possible other cases of wrongful conviction 
officially came under the authority of the prosecution service, although 
it had a number of independent members. At the same time, Parliament 
asked the minister of justice to investigate the possibility of an 
independent innocence commission along the lines of the Criminal 
Cases Review Commission of England and Wales. The report the 
minister commissioned suggested that the great strength of the English 
commission was its complete independence from the police and 
prosecution service, and its ability to conduct its own investigations. 
This had greatly contributed to shoring up the legitimacy of criminal 
justice and had removed a great deal of (media) focus on possible 
wrongful convictions. In turn, this also relieved political pressure on the 
government. The English commission’s weaknesses were its inability to 
deal with cases quickly enough to prevent a large backlog and, 
inevitably, the delay in bringing possible miscarriages to the Court of 
Appeal.71 
 
was originally a witness, but was then questioned by the police as a suspect. No lawyer was present. The 
words of the European Court (“in any event the suspect has the right to consult with a lawyer before and 
during the investigation”) strongly imply that the presence of a lawyer during police questioning is a 
general right. 
 69. LETTER TO THE SECOND CHAMBER OF PARLIAMENT FROM THE MINISTER OF SECURITY AND 
JUSTICE, 16 Nov. 2010 (DDS5673300), http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-
publicaties/brieven/2010/11/16/brief-tweede-kamer-raadsman-bij-het-politieverhoor/brief-raadsman.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2011).  
 70. Id. 
 71. C.H. BRANTS, THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION (CCRC). RAPPORT TEN BEHOEVE 
VAN DE MINISTER VAN JUSTITIE (2006). 
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Focusing on the weaknesses rather than the strengths, the minister 
decided not to introduce an independent innocence commission. Instead, 
he installed the CEAS commission that reviewed two of the 
miscarriages outlined above and recommended revision. A number of 
problems attached to the rules under which the CEAS operated: it was 
not independent of the prosecution service (although it never suffered 
from interference from that quarter), defendants and lawyers could not 
put their own case forward to be reviewed but had to work through the 
prosecution or “external experts” (usually academics interested in the 
case), and importantly, the CEAS was not allowed to examine the role 
of the courts. This latter restriction was logical in view of the civil law 
doctrine of trias politica and the fact that the commission was under the 
authority of the prosecution service. The administration (in this case, the 
prosecution) cannot examine the actions of the judiciary, but CEAS 
regarded this restriction as highly unsatisfactory given that most 
miscarriages also involve judicial errors. 
CEAS was never meant to be a permanent solution. The government 
has finally produced a bill of law which is intended to provide a 
structural opportunity for reviewing possible miscarriages by extending 
the rules of the existing revision procedure with an eye towards 
protecting the wrongfully convicted.72 In short, the new procedure 
redefines the ground for revision, “new evidence,” to include new 
forensic insights. The Supreme Court will still have the final word, but 
the convicted person may file a request with the Procurator-General at 
the Supreme Court for further investigation.73 Before deciding, the PG 
may—or must, if the defendant has been sentenced to 10 years or 
more—forward the request to a commission (comparable to the CEAS) 
that will advise on the necessity of further investigation. In conducting 
that investigation, the PG can call in the assistance of an investigation 
team consisting of police officers, prosecutors and, if necessary, external 
experts. Alternatively, he may have the judge of instruction open an 
investigation. Because it is feared that this more generous regulation of 
revision will lead to a large number of requests, the convicted person 
must be represented by a lawyer. 
These new rules are certainly an improvement although they have 
been criticized for not going far enough. Much of this criticism is highly 
detailed and concerns intricacies of the rules of evidence. However, the 
 
 72. WIJZIGING VAN HET WETBOEK VAN STRAFVORDERING IN VERBAND MET EEN HERVORMING 
VAN DE REGELING BETREFFENDE HERZIENING TEN VOORDELE VAN DE GEWEZEN VERDACHTE (WET 
HERVORMING HERZIENING TEN VOORDELE, TK 2010/2011, 32 045. See also the Explanatory 
Memorandum to this bill of law at TK 2010/2011, 32 045, no. 3.  
 73. The PG at the Supreme Court is not a member of the prosecution service and is regarded as 
independent: his appointment is for life and his main function is to advise the Supreme Court as to the 
applicable law and the interests of justice in the specific cases that come before it. 
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major bone of contention is the fact that the new rules do not provide for 
an independent innocence commission and that they restrict mandatory 
new investigation into the facts to those sentenced to ten years or more. 
Some authors are convinced that the Supreme Court should not be the 
organ of revision at all because it is unlikely to regard decisions by 
fellow judges independently and critically. These critics call for a totally 
independent, administrative innocence commission that will both 
investigate and decide on possible miscarriages of justice.74 Others are 
more enamored of a solution comparable to the English Criminal Cases 
Review Commission. That would still allow the Court of Appeal to have 
the final word on whether a conviction is safe or not, but the 
commission itself would be totally independent in its investigations.75 
One problem, which has also come up in the discussions in Parliament, 
is that the text of the new regulation is unclear about whether errors by 
the courts constitute grounds for revision. In reply to parliamentary 
questions, however, the minister has said that the definition of “new 
evidence” may also include the situation in which the tribunal of fact 
was acquainted with the evidence at the time of trial, but failed to 
recognize its significance, i.e. the Lucia de Berk scenario. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
While there is no way of knowing how often wrongful convictions 
occur in the Netherlands, during the past twenty years it has become 
clear that the criminal justice system is by no means as accurate as the 
Dutch have always thought. What is surprising is not that there have 
been miscarriages of justice that must be regarded as consequences of 
the system. Rather, what is astonishing is that the criminal justice 
authorities and most legal scholars believed, until very recently, that any 
wrongful conviction would be an extremely rare and isolated incident. 
Theoretical consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of 
inquisitorial process reveals that Dutch criminal justice has systemic 
features that make it vulnerable to miscarriages. Whether or not it is just 
as vulnerable as an adversarial system like the American one is a moot 
question. 
The fundamental assumption that state officials can be trusted to 
conduct an independent and non-partisan investigation to find the truth 
that will allow the court to arrive at a reliable and therefore legitimate 
 
 74. H.F.M. CROMBAG, ET AL., HERZIENING: KANTTEKENINGEN BIJ HET W [REVIEW: COMMENTS 
ON THE BILL] (2009), available at http://njblog.nl/2009/03/05/herziening-kanttekeningen-bij-het-
wetsontwerp/. 
 75. C.H. BRANTS & A.A. FRANKEN, OVER DE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION EN DE 
COMMISSIE EVALUATIE AFGESLOTEN STRAFZAKEN 734–54 (2006).  
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verdict forms the major legal-cultural reason why so many in the legal 
world have been unable even to conceive of the system being flawed in 
any way. Under these conditions, the guarantees of due process that 
American legal scholars take as given are seen as unnecessary. The 
Dutch defendant has no right to have a lawyer present during police 
investigations. It is essentially the prosecution that decides the content 
of the dossier and, therefore, the case that is heard by the court. The 
court also has the final word on when it considers it has sufficient 
information to come to a verdict. The court may also refuse a 
defendant’s request to hear more evidence. And finally, debate at trial 
based on autonomous defense rights is not regarded as essential for truth 
finding. 
This state-driven system is surrounded by guarantees that should 
compensate for the lack of autonomous defense participation and 
contribution, namely hierarchical control and monitoring in and between 
the different state participants, of which a full retrial by a higher court 
forms part. The latter should, and perhaps does, mean that such 
inquisitorial systems make less irredeemable mistakes than adversarial 
systems where the defendant has only one chance. However, that is not 
to say that the court of first instance does not often get it wrong,76 while 
such errors usually mean that any wrongfully convicted person will 
spend a considerable time in prison while the appeals system runs its 
course.77 However, the very existence of these guarantees that are meant 
to catch and eradicate mistakes also means that these are only too easily 
passed further up the chain of decision making. This tendency has been 
exacerbated by recent changes to the system in the name of cost-
effectiveness and efficiency (in the sense of better crime control). As the 
police and prosecution service struggle to get the desired result, a 
conviction, the relationship between these changes and intensified media 
pressure has had the effect of undermining the commitment to 
impartiality and of increasing the likelihood of tunnel vision and 
confirmation bias. 
There are no indications that the Dutch police employ violence during 
interrogations—although they are not averse to psychologically coercive 
interrogation techniques. Further, few officers willfully ignore findings 
for the suspect. However, many officers do narrow their focus, seeking 
confirmation of existing suspicions. This undermines the first 
 
 76. If we were to include all the cases of wrongful conviction in first instance, therefore in which 
the court of appeal has acquitted (or the Supreme Court has returned a case for acquittal because of 
fundamental mistakes on points of law made by either of the tribunals of fact), the wrongful conviction 
rate in the Netherlands would be very much higher. 
 77. This problem besets all inquisitorial systems that, because of their reliance on monitoring and 
control and written evidence, generate huge amounts of paper and are very bureaucratic; this in its turn 
leads to fast trials but exceedingly slow procedures as a whole. 
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assumption of their inquisitorial role: an open mind and non-
partisanship. Where traditionally the magisterial, non-partisan 
prosecutor, able and willing to take “judicial” decisions in the name of 
the common good, was the predominant role model,78 this has been 
replaced among a substantial number of prosecutors by the model of the 
crime fighter.79 While non-partisanship would lead the prosecution to 
attempt to falsify police findings, the prosecutor then becomes much 
more likely to seek to verify the police case and to base upon it the 
evidence he will present through the dossier and in court. With, until 
very recently, no external monitoring at all of the pre-trial investigation, 
this is all too easy. 
Moreover, although the courts are traditionally regarded as the most 
important monitors of police and prosecution activities pre-trial, recent 
research indicates that judges are greatly influenced by the way 
prosecutors build and present their cases.80 That renders the courts 
subject to confirmation bias on the basis of their prior knowledge of the 
prosecution’s case. This means that defense allegations that exculpatory 
evidence exists but has not been investigated or disclosed must be very 
strong in order to be admitted to judicial decision making. 
Indeed, it has been said that truth finding in Dutch courts is not 
geared towards discovering whether the evidence points beyond 
reasonable doubt to the guilt of the defendant. Rather, truth finding in 
Dutch courts focuses on whether the available evidence does not 
contradict the prosecutor’s assertion that the defendant is indeed 
guilty.81 It is the same mechanism that undermines the assumption of 
non-partisan gathering of evidence during pre-trial investigation. Dutch 
rules of evidence and the requirement that judges decide in collaboration 
on issues of guilt and innocence should mean that doubts about the 
prosecution case are debated in chambers on the basis of reliable direct 
and corroborative evidence and that possible other scenarios are 
considered. But here too there are inherent weaknesses. 
The problems of expert testimony are, in some ways, no different 
from problems that may occur in other systems of criminal procedure. 
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Judges may be inclined to give too much weight to expert testimony and 
forensic evidence (especially true of DNA). However, it is perhaps more 
problematic that judges will generally have at their disposal the evidence 
of only one expert. While neither judges nor the defense lawyers are 
usually knowledgeable enough to ask the relevant scientific questions at 
trial, the routine absence of an expert for the defense means that the 
court is dependent upon its own, often amateur, evaluation of the 
evidence. 
The negative system of evidence82 and legal requirements as to sorts 
and amount of evidence necessary to convict imply that (possibly false) 
confessions, the statement of a single (possibly biased or untruthful) 
witness, or of a single expert, may never lead to a conviction unless 
there is corroboration of guilt from an independent source. The 
defendant must also have had the opportunity to challenge the evidence 
brought against him. In reality, however, it is possible to convict on two 
sources of evidence—admittedly independent—while the conviction 
nevertheless rests on one witness, one expert, or a confession. The 
conviction of Ina Post is a case in point.83 Moreover, while judges 
should look first at the evidence and then decide whether they find it 
convincing, if their mind is already made up by the information they 
themselves consider sufficient during trial—itself based on mainly the 
prosecution dossier—the judges will then simply look for the legally 
permissible forms of confirmation of what they already think. This 
psychological process is compounded by the fact that, in its written 
reasoning, the court need not discuss all available evidence and any 
residual doubt there may have been, but is merely required to enumerate 
the legally permissible sorts of evidence upon which the decision is 
based. This is true even though judges must give a reasoned response to 
specific defenses. Unanimity among the panel members is not 
necessary.84 
This reality of judicial process is all the more problematic because, 
ultimately, the Dutch place the greatest faith in the career judiciary with 
its “impartial and open-minded” judges. The rationality of the legally 
trained mind and the experience of highly qualified practitioners is 
presumed to guide judicial decision making, not the irrational prejudice 
that may color the verdict of the inexperienced layman, who is probably 
also ignorant of the finer points of law. One of the more troubling 
aspects of a career judiciary, however, is that experience can degenerate 
 
 82. See supra note 35. 
 83. Van Koppen & Schalken, supra note 81. 
 84. Nevertheless, the judiciary is assumed to speak with one voice: dissenting opinions are 
unknown and what goes on in chambers is secret, making research very difficult and dependent on 
experimental situations with panel-groups. 
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into routine, so that panels of judges feel no need to explain to each 
other what the strength or weakness of the case are as all will understand 
them, and that in general a process of group-think governs deliberations. 
This is especially true of younger judges, who are quickly socialized 
into such a process and may well find out that too independent a frame 
of mind is not appreciated.85 
The systemic problems outlined above are all evident in one way or 
the other in the wrongful convictions that have occurred in recent years. 
At last, measures have been designed to deal with them, albeit 
reluctantly, in the face of much public pressure. The question is whether 
the proposed solutions will actually have the desired effect. 
As in any criminal justice system, the first point of risk of a wrongful 
verdict eventually being handed down occurs during police questioning. 
In the Netherlands, there has never been any way of knowing what 
exactly was said during an interrogation, whether a statement was 
skewed to produce confirmation of a suspicion or if a confession was 
tainted by coercion. Written police reports, on which a court may place 
great reliance as corroborating evidence, are not verbatim and do not 
contain the questions asked. Rather, reports of police findings are 
written in the form of a continuous statement made by the suspect. It is 
of course up to the prosecutor to recognize and correct police bias, but 
he is rarely present during the interrogation of a suspect—or a witness 
for that matter—and is usually quite content to rely on police findings. 
Besides making sure that the police are aware of the dangers of the type 
of interrogation techniques they employ (through education and 
training), there are other ways of countering the risk of coercive 
questioning, false confessions or tunnel vision—or at least being able to 
detect whether they have occurred. Ensuring that a suspect is informed 
of his rights is a sine qua non, while there is also audiovisual registration 
of interrogations or the physical presence of a lawyer in the 
interrogation room.  
All of the above have now, finally, found their way into the Dutch 
version of inquisitorial justice. However, from the grudging introduction 
of the caution in 1926 to the greatly reluctant acceptance of the 
probability that the European Court’s definition of essential fair trial 
rights includes the presence of a lawyer during police questioning, their 
reception has been half-hearted. Attempts to undermine these measures 
by the creation of legal exceptions are probably only to be expected. 
Audiovisual registration of interrogations is very important in the 
Netherlands, given the lack of verbatim transcripts, yet still, the position 
of the defense is weak and decisions as to what information is to be 
 
 85. KEIJSER ET AL., supra note 80, at 36–38. 
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disclosed are still in the hands of the prosecution and courts with the 
same exceptions as apply to withholding information about or obtained 
from witnesses. We may expect that, eventually, there will be a right in 
the Netherlands to have a lawyer present during questioning, but as yet 
this has not materialized other than for underage suspects. 
There is a fundamental tension between the notion of the suspect as 
an object of investigation and source of information, and the idea of an 
autonomous subject at law with inalienable fair trial rights. This was 
explicitly argued in 1926 when the question was asked why would a 
policeman want to encourage a suspect to remain silent when the 
suspect is the one who knows most about the crime. In this sense, there 
is something to the American assertion that inquisitorial process is based 
on a presumption of guilt. In essence, the same argument has been used 
to deny suspects the right to a lawyer during questioning because 
lawyers will most likely tell their clients not to say anything and will, 
therefore, hinder the investigation. It does not seem to occur to these 
opponents of legal assistance, who would all regard themselves as 
proponents of fair trial rights, that there is something contradictory 
about accepting the right to remain silent as a fundamental aspect of due 
process and yet wanting to ensure that it is not exercised. 
Moreover, in the specific Dutch situation, where there has always 
been a decided hint of smugness to the faith attached to the ability and 
integrity of the criminal justice authorities and judiciary, it has proved 
exceedingly difficult to introduce any form of external monitoring. 
Among those who oppose such a notion are not only the professionals of 
the criminal justice system, but many, if not most, of the leading legal 
academics. This applies in particular to the judiciary. It is telling that 
there is only one, very small, innocence project in the Netherlands that is 
regarded as renegade. The project’s findings have often been literally, 
laughed out of court. Distrust of external monitoring is also probably the 
main reason why the new rules on revision do not instigate a true 
innocence commission but, instead, place decisions on whether or not a 
case should be reinvestigated first with the procurator-general at the 
Supreme Court and then with the Court itself. Although the PG 
functions independently, and the position has the same guarantees for 
independence as that of a judge, the PG is nevertheless “part of the 
system.” He is not an outsider but a member of the judiciary, albeit one 
with idiosyncratic powers. The official argument for opting for this 
specific solution is twofold: constitutional arrangements (i.e. the trias 
politica) preclude any judgment or criticism of the judiciary by any 
institution but itself, and it is preferable to have in place a ruling that is 
coherent within the Dutch system rather than looking for solutions 
elsewhere (i.e. installing a commission akin to the Criminal Cases 
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Review Commission). 
It is neither surprising, nor unwise, that the government has not opted 
to “borrow” from the essentially different adversarial system. Damaska 
has shown convincingly that allowing American trial judges to cross-
examine witnesses would require a complete overhaul of institutional 
and procedural arrangements in the U.S.86 The same applies vice versa. 
There is, moreover, a very real danger that such legal transplants will 
have the same result as sawing down a leg in the assumption that the 
table will stop wobbling, while with hindsight, it turns out that the floor 
is uneven. By then, the chance of restoring the table’s equilibrium is 
almost certainly gone forever. 
Nevertheless, while the proposed “measures of improvement” that 
have come in the wake of the public scandals about wrongful 
convictions are—rightly so—designed to fit into the inquisitorial 
scheme that governs Dutch criminal process, these measures still 
presume the ability of the system to ensure its own coherence and 
integrity, i.e. to police itself. The measures allow for no real defense 
participation or “outside interference” although it would be perfectly 
possible to design forms of both that are essentially compatible with 
inquisitorial process. What has now been put in place may perhaps be 
viewed as “state strategic selection mechanisms,” designed to take the 
sting out of public criticism and unrest and to prevent even further 
reaching demands for reform.87 Whatever the case, the very fact that the 
government has been forced by the revelations of wrongful convictions 
to do anything at all is a new and welcome development. For the first 
time, the Dutch criminal justice system now contains features that imply 
a healthy distrust of, rather than blind confidence in, the law and judicial 
authority. That is something that both the criminal justice authorities and 
the mainstream legal community in the Netherlands have never 
countenanced easily. 
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